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33 
A New Start on the Road Not Taken: Driving with 
Lane to Head Off Disability-Based Denials of Rights  
Anita Silvers*  
Leslie Pickering Francis** 
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) is the last of the 
major civil rights statutes passed by Congress, following statutes 
protecting people from discrimination based on race, color, religion, 
sex, and national origin1 as well as age2 and pregnancy.3 In recent 
years, courts have increasingly moved toward constitutional and 
statutory interpretations that limit the ability of plaintiffs to bring suit 
for alleged violations of their civil rights under these statutes.4 This 
movement has been especially problematic for ADA plaintiffs, who 
do not have the successes of the more robust earlier civil rights 
tradition behind them and who have been beset as well with 
misconceptualizations of disability, disability discrimination, and the 
ADA itself. 
When civil rights plaintiffs bring cases alleging discrimination 
based on disability, even apparent victories have proven deeply 
problematic for subsequent plaintiffs claiming discrimination. This 
pattern antedates the ADA. The Supreme Court’s holding in City of 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center that the rational basis test applies 
to equal protection challenges arising from disability5 has been far 
more devastating to subsequent plaintiffs than the benefit of the 
 
 * B.A., Sarah Lawrence College, 1962; Ph.D., Johns Hopkins University, 1967; 
Professor and Chair, Department of Philosophy, San Francisco State University.  
 ** B.A., Wellesley College, 1967; Ph.D., University of Michigan, 1974; J.D., University 
of Utah, 1981; Alfred C. Emery Professor of Law and Professor and Chair, Department of 
Philosophy, University of Utah.  
 1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).  
 2. 29 U.S.C. § 623. 
 3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e(k).  
 4. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (defining disability to require 
assessment of actual disability while in a corrected state).  
 5. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
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actual victory in the case. The Court ruled that the city’s zoning 
ordinance requiring a permit for group homes as applied to a group 
home for people with mental retardation was invalid because the city 
had offered no reasonable basis for allowing some unrelated people 
to share a residence while denying people with mental retardation the 
same opportunity.6 This victory proved pyrrhic, however, because the 
Court embedded a theory about disability classification into its 
favorable ruling that has effectively constricted even successful 
disability discrimination cases from securing broader liberating 
effects.7  
The disappointing doctrine introduced in Cleburne was that 
finding a disability-based denial of a right to be wrongful in one case 
should not throw suspicion on similar disability-based denials of 
rights,8 even under the same zoning ordinance that was the subject of 
litigation in Cleburne. If litigation victories are in principle not to be 
extrapolated heuristically, they cannot effectively discourage further 
disability discrimination. Judicial recognition of the pernicious 
influence of disability discrimination in one case therefore often goes 
very little distance, or nowhere at all, toward making other disabled 
people more secure in the exercise of rights. Thus, Cleburne 
forestalled the development of a prophylactic strategy that could have 
firmly attached the onus of discrimination to practices depriving 
disabled people of their opportunity to exercise a citizen’s usual 
rights. 
 
 6. Id. at 450. 
 7. Other cases may or may not prove to have been pyrrhic, given later legal 
developments. Consider, for example, Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998). Abbott’s 
holding, that the HIV positive plaintiff was a person with a disability because her HIV status 
substantially affected her major life activity of reproduction, was a victory for Abbott and for 
people with HIV. Id. at 655. On the other hand, the individualized analysis performed by the 
Court in Abbott has been used in subsequent decisions to narrow the definition of “disability” 
to inquiries about the individual plaintiff’s characteristics in a corrected state, an approach that 
is not required by Abbott. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999) (“The 
definition of disability also requires that disabilities be evaluated ‘with respect to an individual’ 
and be determined based on whether an impairment substantially limits the ‘major life activities 
of such individual.’ Thus, whether a person has a disability under the ADA is an individualized 
inquiry.” (citations omitted)). 
 8. See, e.g., Anita Silvers & Michael Ashley Stein, Disability, Equal Protection, and the 
Supreme Court: Standing at the Crossroads of Progressive and Retrogressive Logic in 
Constitutional Classification, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 81, 98 (2001). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol23/iss1/3
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The Supreme Court’s recent holding in Tennessee v. Lane (a Title 
II ADA case) that Congress validly exercised its enforcement powers 
under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit disability 
discrimination with regard to access to courts,9 might also fall victim 
to courts’ reluctance to generalize from disabled plaintiffs’ wins. 
Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination in the provision of public 
services.10 The Eleventh Amendment bars suits by private individuals 
against states when their sovereign immunity has not been waived or 
abrogated.11 Lane is understood to establish that Congress properly 
used its section 5 powers to abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity 
with regard to Title II of the ADA as applied to access to courts.12 
The idea that affirmations of protection against disability 
discrimination ought not to be extrapolated goes badly wrong, we 
will argue, when courts suppose Lane to imply that only access to the 
courts, and no other kind of disability-based state-promoted 
exclusion, qualifies for congressionally crafted rights-based 
protection.  
In this Article, our ultimate goal is to demonstrate how advocates 
for the civil rights of people with disabilities can use Lane to 
construct a successful rights-based strategy. In doing so, we will 
show that Lane embarks upon a palpable and promising (but yet to be 
explicitly announced) rights-based standard to which important kinds 
of differential treatment of people with disabilities should be held. 
This strategy maps the way for legal thinking about disability 
discrimination to return from the wrong road down which Cleburne 
drove the national effort to achieve integration for people with 
disabilities.13 Our approach deflects disability discrimination and 
 
 9. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533–34 (2004). 
 10. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000).  
 11. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI; Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
 12. See, e.g., United States v. Georgia (Goodman), 126 S. Ct. 877, 881 (2006).  
 13. See Leslie Francis & Anita Silvers, Introduction to AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: 
EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS, at xiii–xxvii 
(Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds., 2000) (exploring the ADA as a culmination of a 
national effort at least a half a century long to integrate people with disabilities into mainstream 
social institutions); see also Jacobus tenBroek, The Right to Live in the World: The Disabled in 
the Law of Torts, 54 CAL. L. REV. 841, 841 (1966) (“[N]othing could be more essential to 
personality, social existence, economic opportunity—in short, to individual well-being and 
integration into the life of the community—than . . . public approval[] and the legal right to be 
abroad in the land.”).  
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opens up opportunities for disabled people to exercise important 
rights that other citizens enjoy by turning attention to the public value 
of their doing so.  
To reach our destination, we begin with accounts of Cleburne and 
then of Lane itself. Cleburne, decided before the ADA’s enactment, 
advanced the claim that differential treatment of mentally disabled 
people under a zoning law violated constitutional equal protection 
requirements.14 The city’s defense was that it had a rational basis for 
the differential treatment.15 In Lane, the Court applied a due process 
analysis to a case claiming that inaccessible courthouses violated 
Title II of the ADA.16 Tennessee’s response was that Title II had not 
validly abrogated state sovereign immunity protected by the Eleventh 
Amendment.17 This response has gained momentum in the ten years 
since the Rehnquist Court’s decision invalidating the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act.18 It was applied to the employment 
discrimination title of the ADA in the 2001 Garrett decision19 and 
since then has cast a shadow over the prospects of achieving 
integration for people with disabilities, especially with regard to their 
being offered equitable opportunity when a program is operated by a 
state.  
Suits by private individuals against states for money damages, 
which are barred by the Eleventh Amendment (except where 
Congress has acted validly under section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment) are important for several reasons. They benefit 
individual plaintiffs economically and thus recompense them for the 
various challenges of undertaking litigation. They provide a resource 
through which lawyers for plaintiffs claiming discrimination can be 
paid, through a contingency fee arrangement or otherwise. The 
prospect of money damages therefore helps citizens seeking legal 
relief to gain access to representation.20  
 
 14. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 432–33 (1985). 
 15. Id. at 447–50. 
 16. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 511 (2004). 
 17. Id. at 514. 
 18. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), superseded by statute, Religious Land 
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803. 
 19. Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
 20. Ruth Colker, The Section 5 Quagmire, 47 UCLA L. REV. 653, 660 (2000). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol23/iss1/3
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It has long been established, since Ex parte Young,21 that state 
actors may be sued in their official capacities for injunctive relief 
against illegal actions.22 This legal fiction has the result of allowing 
plaintiffs to obtain injunctive relief against legally problematic state 
actions. However, suits for injunctions benefit individual plaintiffs 
only if they can meet the standard of the real and immediate 
likelihood of continuing harm;23 they are thus harder for individual 
plaintiffs to win and do not provide any protection at all for plaintiffs 
alleging past acts of state discrimination. More generally, because 
suits by private individuals for money damages against states must 
find shelter under the Fourteenth Amendment to proceed, they can be 
crucial for clarifying the standard of reasoning that must be reached 
to exclude disabled people from access to fundamental services and 
rights. They therefore are a vehicle for eliciting and exploring 
influential views about the constitutionality of exclusionary treatment 
of people with disabilities. 
As we bring Lane on stage, it nonetheless remains important to 
emphasize the limited confines of the dispute about state sovereign 
immunity. Eleventh Amendment immunity does not bar suits brought 
by the United States against states for money damages or suits by 
private individuals for injunctive relief against state officials acting in 
their official capacity.24 Section 1983 suits for damages remain 
available to citizens suing state actors for violations of their 
constitutional rights.25 The possibility of injunctive relief is not 
negligible, either for individual plaintiffs who can meet this showing 
or for class plaintiffs who can show ongoing discrimination that 
warrants correction.26 The Eleventh Amendment also does not protect 
local governmental units such as municipalities; the shield it provides 
is peculiar to state governments.27 Moreover, states may waive 
 
 21. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
 22. Id. at 168. 
 23. See Daan Braveman, Enforcement of Federal Rights Against States: Alden and 
Federalism Non-Sense, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 611, 620 (2000). 
 24. Id. at 627–28; see also Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 n.9. 
 25. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). 
 26. Braveman, supra note 23, at 627.  
 27. Ability Ctr. of Greater Toledo v. City of Sandusky, 385 F.3d 901, 902 n.2 (6th Cir. 
2004). 
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sovereign immunity, for example, by accepting federal funds, such as 
those distributed under the Rehabilitation Act or the Medicaid 
statute.28 Even if difficult to penetrate, the shield of sovereign 
immunity does not repel the project of remedying disability 
discrimination that is embedded in public policy or practice. The 
significance of the cases we examine must be assessed with these 
limitations in mind. 
We begin our analysis with Cleburne, the crucial seminal case in 
which the Supreme Court addressed the rights of (some) people with 
disabilities. We then turn to an examination of Lane against the 
background of Cleburne. Both Cleburne and Lane can be given either 
narrower, case-specific readings or broader, rights-protective 
readings. Before Lane, we will argue, some lower federal courts, with 
narrow readings of Cleburne in the background, had adopted the 
rejectionist conclusion that Title II of the ADA did not validly 
abrogate state sovereign immunity. Others had reached the opposite, 
rights-recognizing conclusion. This pattern has continued after Lane, 
with some courts applying their narrow rejectionist precedent (except 
in the exact circumstances of Lane), while other courts limit Lane to 
courthouse access, and still other courts read Lane as recognizing a 
broader scope of rights. We criticize the reasoning of the rejectionist 
courts, explaining how they have misunderstood both Lane and the 
structure of protection against discrimination claims by persons with 
disabilities that it advances. We shall then draw on the decisions of 
rights-recognizing courts to construct a template for a broader set of 
civil rights claims for people with disabilities under Title II of the 
ADA.  
The misunderstandings shared by courts with a narrow reading of 
Lane run deep in two related ways, we shall argue. The initial 
misunderstanding arises from two theories introduced in Cleburne. 
The first is that government action that treats people differently based 
on disability is more likely than not to be beneficial to them, whereas 
 
 28. For an argument that federal policy goals can be largely achieved within the limits of 
current law and that the Eleventh Amendment rulings principally represent a shift in power 
from the legislative to the executive and judicial branches, see Jesse H. Choper & John C. Yoo, 
Who’s Afraid of the Eleventh Amendment? The Limited Impact of the Court’s Sovereign 
Immunity Rulings, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 213 (2006).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol23/iss1/3
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differential treatment of people based on race or sex is more likely to 
harm them. The second is that disabilities are serious differences, 
whereas race- and sex-associated differences are not. The conjunction 
of these two theories drives the doctrine that disability-based 
classifications do not merit either the strict scrutiny standard 
accorded to race-based classifications or the heightened scrutiny 
standard accorded to sex-based classifications.29 Courts sometimes 
have attached a curious corollary to this doctrine, one that cannot be 
justified by the theories alone, namely, that there should be broad 
acceptance of disability-based, differentially disadvantageous 
treatment as long as it is supplied with some rationale.30  
A further misunderstanding, we contend, is that the ADA is not 
really a civil rights statute at all, but a “helping hand” to people who 
need assistance because of their own deficits. This misunderstanding 
begins with the observation that among civil rights statutes, the ADA 
is the only one requiring “reasonable accommodation” for otherwise-
qualified individuals in employment (found in Title I of the ADA),31 
“reasonable modification” for otherwise-qualified individuals in 
public services (found in Title II),32 or “readily achievable” removal 
of barriers in public accommodations (found in Title III).33 This 
observation has led some commentators to conclude that courts have 
backed away from enforcing ADA rights because ADA cases are not 
about rights at all, but instead turn on judgments about how much 
special help is sufficient and how much is too much.34  
Contrary to these misinterpretations, we will argue, the ADA is a 
civil rights statute. Understanding the ADA as a civil rights statute 
can be the basis for a carefully constructed post-Lane strategy that 
echoes the original and highly successful strategy of the NAACP 
Legal Defense Fund leading up to Brown v. Board of Education.35 
 
 29. The reasoning in Cleburne has been criticized by one of the authors. See Silvers & 
Stein, supra note 8, at 98. 
 30. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001). 
 31. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000). 
 32. Id. § 12131(2). 
 33. Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). 
 34. See, e.g., KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 
176–77 (2006). 
 35. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). For an account of the Brown strategy, 
see JEROLD AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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I. CLEBURNE: LOWER OR HIGHER PROTECTION? 
Decided in 1985, twelve years after Congress amended the 
Rehabilitation Act with the protections against disability 
discrimination contained in sections 503 and 50436 and seven years 
before the passage of the ADA, Cleburne was a landmark ruling 
because, for the first time, the Supreme Court fixed a disapproving 
gaze on disability discrimination.37 Earlier Supreme Court 
engagements with disability are epitomized by the infamous 1927 
Buck v. Bell decision, in which Justice Holmes upheld the 
sterilization of seventeen-year-old Carrie Buck—mistakenly 
diagnosed as “feebleminded”—by asserting that society has the right 
to deprive “deficient” people of reproductive liberty.38 Cleburne 
marks the first explicit acknowledgement by the Supreme Court that 
the United States Constitution might offer disabled people judicial 
relief from public policy that enforced their exclusion.  
Certain contextual elements illuminate the broader dilemmas 
faced by the Court in Cleburne and help to explain why, in that 
historical moment, the Court may have found disregarding disability 
discrimination to be an unacceptable option. At the time at least two 
broad considerations prompted by regard for the public good would 
have weighed against letting the City of Cleburne’s ordinance stand. 
This was, first of all, an era of great effort to reverse the century-old 
policy of excising disabled people from the community by 
institutionalizing them.39 Institutionalization had been undertaken in 
the name of relieving non-disabled people of the incursions that 
caring for the disabled imposed on their time and energy for 
productive work.40 However, the burden of supporting disabled 
people in institutions eventually came to seem even more prohibitive 
than relying on their families for their care, especially as courts began 
 
AMERICA (1976). 
 36. 29 U.S.C. §§ 793, 794. 
 37. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
 38. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (“Three generations of imbeciles are 
enough.”).  
 39. See, e.g., JUDITH LYNN FAILER, WHO QUALIFIES FOR RIGHTS? HOMELESSNESS, 
MENTAL ILLNESS, AND CIVIL COMMITMENT (2002). 
 40. See, e.g., JAMES W. TRENT, JR., INVENTING THE FEEBLE MIND: A HISTORY OF 
MENTAL RETARDATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1994) (especially chapters 1–4).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol23/iss1/3
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to rule out the cost-saving but cruel practices upon which the 
economic sustainability of state-run institutions had been built.41 The 
public, therefore, had an interest in advancing the 
deinstitutionalization program, which depended on the establishment 
of small group homes in the community like the one that the City of 
Cleburne banned. 
Second, Cleburne was litigated when the practice of zoning 
ordinances that segregated neighborhoods according to race had only 
recently been repudiated.42 Although its subject was segregation by 
intellectual capacity rather than by race, Cleburne exhumed the 
possibility that some citizens could prevent other citizens from 
becoming their neighbors solely because of the potential newcomers’ 
biological differences. Significantly, the city defended its ordinance 
with a set of reasons that attempted to shift away from this basis for 
exclusion by characterizing the group home’s location as a threat,43 
but the Supreme Court rejected these reasons as pretextual.44  
In Cleburne, the city claimed that denying residence to 
intellectually disabled people advanced several state interests.45 One 
was to maintain the serenity of the neighborhood.46 However, the 
zoning ordinance permitted fraternity houses to be established,47 and 
fraternity houses are legendary for shattering serenity. Another was 
the concern about the legal responsibility of the group home’s 
residents for their actions,48 but the ordinance permitted nursing 
homes and hospitals, whose residents are not always fully competent 
 
 41. See, e.g., Carol Appathurai et al., Achieving the Vision of Deinstitutionalization: A 
Role for Foster Care?, 3 CHILD & ADOLESCENT SOC. WORK J. 50 (1986); David Braddock, 
Deinstitutionalization of the Retarded: Trends in Public Policy, 32 HOSP. & COMMUNITY 
PSYCHIATRY 607 (1981); Paul G. Stiles et al., Before and After Deinstitutionalization: 
Comparing State Hospitalization Utilization, Staffing, and Costs in 1949 and 1988, 23 ADMIN. 
& POL’Y MENTAL HEALTH & MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES RES. 513 (1996).  
 42. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1948). 
 43. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985) (“[T]he 
Council was concerned with . . . the fears of elderly residents of the neighborhood.”). 
 44. Id. (“But mere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are 
properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding, are not permissible bases for treating a home for 
the mentally retarded differently . . . .”). 
 45. See id. at 448–50. 
 46. Id. at 450.  
 47. Id. at 449. 
 48. Id. 
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and responsible adults. Other proposed justifications for the 
ordinance—dense occupancy, congested streets, fire hazards, and the 
avoidance of danger to other residents49—similarly could not be 
defended as pertaining only to the prohibited group. The city could 
not explain why thirteen mentally retarded people constituted a 
denser occupation than thirteen fraternity brothers in the same space 
or why they, who did not drive cars, would cause more traffic than 
thirteen occupants of a boarding house or apartment house.50 Nor did 
the city offer evidence that the proposed residents of the group home 
were a greater fire hazard, or that fire posed a greater hazard to them, 
or that they were more dangerous to neighbors, or that they were in 
more danger from neighbors than some of the groups of other kinds 
of unrelated people whom the ordinance explicitly designated as 
being welcome to reside in the city.51  
The city also contended that the exclusion had protection of 
mentally retarded people at its heart, since the area was prone to 
flooding that might drown them, and children at the neighborhood 
school might harass them.52 But the Court observed that mentally 
retarded people were no more vulnerable to being drowned in floods 
than residents of nursing homes and hospitals, among the types of 
facilities which the ordinance explicitly permitted.53 And if the school 
children presented such a hazard to mentally retarded people, why 
were about thirty mentally retarded students assigned to the school 
itself?54 In sum, in Cleburne the reasons given to justify 
disadvantageously differential treatment of disabled people either did 
not apply to them or applied equally well to favorably treated people. 
Consequently, the Court provided equal protection to the mentally 
retarded individuals who were potential residents of the group home 
by invalidating the ordinance as applied to them.55 It is the procedural 
right of equal protection (that is, the right to be treated equally before 
the law) and not a substantive right that the Court upheld in 
 
 49. Id. at 450.  
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 449. 
 52. Id.  
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 450. 
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Cleburne. This is not to say that Cleburne categorically ignored or 
denied mentally retarded people’s substantive rights: “[T]he mentally 
retarded, like others, have and retain their substantive constitutional 
rights in addition to the right to be treated equally by the law.”56  
We may usefully consider the reasoning the Court found 
permissible in staking out the narrow procedural ground that enabled 
integration of deinstitutionalized mentally retarded people into 
residential neighborhoods. This reasoning goes to whether claims of a 
rational basis for excluding people based on disability are pretextual. 
Reasoning with such a pedigree should be a sure guide to sustaining 
complaints that certain differential treatments constitute or are 
importantly related to constitutionally prohibited disability 
discrimination. 
Noticing the relationship between the Fifth Circuit’s holding in 
Cleburne and the Supreme Court’s subsequent response helps to 
understand how what was struck down differed from what remained. 
The Fifth Circuit offered two arguments for attending to the 
legitimacy of the reasons the city gave for disadvantageously treating 
unrelated mentally retarded people in regard to their establishing a 
home together.57 The Supreme Court rejected the first—that mentally 
retarded people form a quasi-suspect class—by insisting that real 
differences between them and other people explain their being treated 
differently and that, on the whole, their differential treatment by the 
state either benefits them with special access to resources and 
opportunities, or otherwise benefits them by protecting them from 
themselves.58 But the Supreme Court did not directly engage the 
second rationale advanced by the Fifth Circuit, namely, that the 
importance of the opportunity the state denies is relevant to how 
thoroughly courts may examine the purported reasons for doing so. 
Indeed, the Court appears to have proceeded under this notion to 
examine the city’s reasons for denying a place to live to the mentally 
retarded people, but not to other unrelated groups of people.59  
 
 56. Id. at 447.  
 57. Id. at 435. 
 58. Id. at 442. 
 59. Id. at 449–50. 
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The idea that differences in treatment are not necessarily disability 
discrimination seems to have weighed so heavily with the Supreme 
Court as to have prompted embedding several discursive observations 
to this effect in the Cleburne decision. The Court listed and praised 
both federal and state policies that either provide special benefits for 
mentally retarded people or otherwise exempt them from ordinary 
standards and responsibilities: 
Such legislation thus singling out the retarded for special 
treatment reflects the real and undeniable differences between 
the retarded and others. That a civilized and decent society 
expects and approves such legislation indicates that 
governmental consideration of those differences in the vast 
majority of situations is not only legitimate but also 
desirable.60 
In making this point less than a decade after Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke61 (concerns about the 
constitutionality of affirmative programs that appear to privilege 
minorities were also part of the historical context in which Cleburne 
was decided), the Court seemed most concerned with closing the 
door on reverse discrimination complaints against beneficial 
treatment specifically of the disabled.62 Subsequently, Justice Stevens 
cited Cleburne in his dissents in both Adarand Constructors v. Pena63 
and Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,64 two cases where the 
 
 60. Id. at 444. 
 61. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).  
 62. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446.  
 63. See 515 U.S. 200, 242–64 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens wrote: 
Nothing is inherently wrong with applying a single standard to fundamentally different 
situations, as long as that standard takes relevant differences into account. For 
example, if the Court in all equal protection cases were to insist that differential 
treatment be justified by relevant characteristics of the members of the favored and 
disfavored classes that provide a legitimate basis for disparate treatment, such a 
standard would treat dissimilar cases differently while still recognizing that there is, 
after all, only one Equal Protection Clause. 
Id. at 246. 
 64. 476 U.S. 267, 313–20 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
In every equal protection case, we have to ask certain basic questions. What class is 
harmed by the legislation, and has it been subjected to a tradition of disfavor by our 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol23/iss1/3
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majority opinion relied on equal protection considerations to rule 
against affirmative action plans. 
The Court was emphatically concerned to proof restrictive aspects 
of beneficent legislation against equal protection challenges: “Much 
recent legislation intended to benefit the retarded also assumes the 
need for measures that might be perceived to disadvantage them.”65 
For example, the federal government “provided the retarded with the 
right to receive ‘appropriate treatment, services, and habilitation,’” 
but only in a setting that is “‘least restrictive of [their] personal 
liberty.’ In addition, the Government has conditioned federal 
education funds on a State’s assurance that retarded children will 
enjoy an education that, ‘to the maximum extent appropriate,’ is 
integrated with that of non-mentally-retarded children.”66 These 
provisions quoted by the Court could be read as endorsements of 
limiting the integration and liberty of such statutes’ beneficiaries, 
which the Court took to be a reasonable burden to place on mentally 
retarded people as the price of their being given access to treatment, 
services, and education.67  
In sum, the Court believed that because “lawmakers have been 
addressing [mentally retarded people’s] difficulties in a manner that 
belies a continuing antipathy or prejudice,”68 there was no 
constitutionally impelled “need for more intrusive oversight by the 
judiciary”69 and “even assuming that many of these laws could be 
shown to be substantially related to an important governmental 
purpose, merely requiring the legislature to justify its efforts in these 
terms may lead it to refrain from acting at all.”70 Therefore, 
differential treatment of mentally retarded people need only be 
rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose and may 
burden this group singularly, but only “in what is essentially an 
 
laws? What is the public purpose that is being served by the law? What is the 
characteristic of the disadvantaged class that justifies the disparate treatment? 
Id. at 313 n.1 (quotations and citation omitted). 
 65. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 444. 
 66. Id. at 443 (citations omitted). 
 67. Id. at 444. 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. at 443. 
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incidental manner.”71 That legislatures appeared at the time to be 
helping such people thus led the Court to rebuff the Fifth Circuit’s 
characterization of the classification.  
Yet there remains the question of a threshold—that is, how good 
must a reason invoking a rational relation to a government purpose be 
to permit harming rather than helping people based on their falling 
under a given classification. It may be thought that the standard is 
met as long as any rationale is invoked, or even that satisfactory 
rationales must be presumed without the state having to articulate 
them. But the Cleburne Court’s view in this regard reflects the Fifth 
Circuit’s. According to the Cleburne Court, “the State may not rely 
on a classification whose relationship to an asserted goal is so 
attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational.”72  
In Cleburne the Court illustrates how to inspect rationales for 
differential treatment for irrationality or arbitrariness.73 Of course, the 
state must articulate the reasons for the differential treatment, if the 
state’s reasoning is to be available for inspection.74 To escape charges 
of irrationality or arbitrariness, reasons must apply to the people 
disadvantaged by the policy, but not equally to (some) people favored 
under the policy.75 Because the reasons asserted for the City of 
Cleburne’s ordinance excluding mentally retarded people from 
residence in the neighborhood either did not apply to the prospective 
residents of the group home, or otherwise equally applied to other 
residents welcome under the ordinance, the Cleburne Court held that 
the application of the ordinance as it stood “appears to us to rest on 
an irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded.”76  
To be sure, the Cleburne Court explicitly declined to apply 
heightened scrutiny, which would have required a substantial 
connection between differential treatment and the public interest, as 
 
 71. Id. at 446. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 448–50. 
 74. If the state does not articulate its reasons for differential treatment—that is, remains 
silent about them—it will be impossible for the courts to inspect the state’s actual reasons, 
although the courts could of course construct reasons on behalf of the state. See, e.g., 
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955) (stating “The legislature might 
have concluded that . . . .”).   
 75. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 447–48. 
 76. Id. at 450.  
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well as an interest of increased importance, to policies that invoked 
“mental retardation” as a differentiating classification.77 But the 
Cleburne Court nevertheless carefully inspected whether there was a 
tenable connection between the policy abrogating mentally retarded 
individuals’ access to fair—that is, non-segregated—housing and a 
legitimate public purpose.78 No such tenable connection being 
discovered, the Court found that the ordinance’s targeting of the 
mentally retarded people in question was pretextual.79 
II. LANE: NARROWER OR BROADER? 
In Tennessee v. Lane80 the Supreme Court confronted whether 
Congress had properly used its enforcement powers under section 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment in enacting Title II of the ADA. Title 
II prohibits discrimination in the provision of public services to 
people who are otherwise eligible for them; it requires reasonable 
modification but not fundamental alteration of the services at issue.81 
The plaintiffs in Lane had sued the state because several state 
courtrooms were inaccessible to people with mobility impairments.82 
Several years before Lane the Court’s Garrett decision had held that 
states were immune from suits for money damages under Title I of 
the ADA (the employment discrimination title).83 Garrett had 
reasoned that Congress based the prohibition of employment 
discrimination on equal protection grounds, but had not relied on 
evidence sufficient to provide a rational basis for concluding that 
states were engaged in patterns of employment discrimination against 
people with disabilities that required remediation.84 The Court’s 
immediate conclusion in Lane was that Title II required access to the 
courts and was a permissible use of Congress’s section 5 powers.85 
 
 77. Id. at 442.  
 78. Id. at 448–50.  
 79. Id. at 450. 
 80. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004). 
 81. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2000). 
 82. Lane, 541 U.S. at 513. 
 83. Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001). 
 84. Id.  
 85. Lane, 541 U.S. at 531. 
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What the Court said in reaching this immediate conclusion has been 
given importantly different understandings, however. 
The “broad” reading of Lane is that it allowed Congress’s use of 
section 5 enforcement powers to enforce constitutional due process 
rights. The “narrow” reading of Lane is that it is specifically limited 
to the right of access to courts. In this section, we set out the Court’s 
reasoning in Lane, showing how the majority opinion can be 
construed to support the broad reading, but also explaining why the 
opinion has been read more narrowly by some courts.  
Lane came to the Court from the Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit;86 some understanding of Sixth Circuit precedent is helpful in 
contextualizing the case. In a decision before Lane, the Sixth Circuit 
held in Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas87 that 
Garrett barred all private ADA suits against states based on equal 
protection principles, but did not prohibit suits based on due process 
principles.88 In its decision in the Lane litigation, the Sixth Circuit 
denied the state’s motion to dismiss, following Popovich.89 The Sixth 
Circuit’s decision applied this general due process analysis to protect 
rights of access to the courts.90 It emphasized that Congress’s 
findings in enacting the ADA established that physical barriers in 
 
 86. See Lane v. Tennessee, 315 F.3d 680 (6th Cir. 2003).  
 87. Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, 276 F.3d 808 (6th Cir. 2002) 
(en banc). Popovich, a hearing-impaired plaintiff, alleged he had been denied hearing assistance 
in a child custody hearing. Id. at 811. The panel decision of the Sixth Circuit had dismissed the 
case on sovereign immunity grounds, reasoning that Congress had overstepped its section 5 
enforcement powers in enacting Title II of the ADA because disability warrants only rational 
basis scrutiny. Id. The rehearing en banc, delayed until after the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Garrett, analyzed the case on due process grounds. Id. at 812. The Popovich court concluded 
that the plaintiff had been deprived of the due process right to participate meaningfully in the 
custody hearing. See id. at 815. Relationships between parents and their children are 
fundamental rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment; therefore, on a due process 
analysis, heightened scrutiny was appropriate and Congress had properly utilized its section 5 
enforcement powers. Id. In cases involving such rights, Congress had not expanded the 
meaning of due process, but merely had enforced it. Id. Judge Moore, concurring in the 
judgment, argued that Garrett had not precluded a Title II equal protection analysis; her 
argument was that the classification in this case was so invidious (citing Cleburne) that it could 
not survive rational basis scrutiny and thus was a proper use of Congress’s enforcement powers 
under an equal protection analysis. Id. at 818 (Moore, J., concurring). 
 88. Id. at 811 (majority opinion).  
 89. Lane, 315 F.3d at 682 (“Among the rights protected by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is the right of access to the courts.”). 
 90. Id. at 683.  
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government buildings had denied essential services to people with 
disabilities—that is, were not beneficial but resulted from 
“unconstitutional animus” and “impermissible stereotypes.”91  
Justice Stevens authored the Supreme Court’s five to four 
majority opinion in Lane, setting forth the issue under the broader 
analytical terms of the Sixth Circuit: “The question presented in this 
case is whether Title II exceeds Congress’ power under § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”92 The opinion then presents the litigation 
history, as is customary, but in a manner that echoes the lower court’s 
broad framing of the issue, reasoning that Garrett barred ADA Title 
II suits based on equal protection but not those based on due 
process.93 The Court approvingly quotes the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning 
that the Due Process Clause protects the right of access to courts: 
barriers in “‘government buildings, including courthouses . . . have 
had the effect of denying disabled people the opportunity to access 
vital services and to exercise fundamental rights guaranteed by the 
Due Process Clause’”; and that these failures may “‘result directly 
from unconstitutional animus and impermissible stereotypes.’”94 
Following this history, Justice Stevens also characterizes the ADA 
broadly, as comprehensively addressing “discrimination against 
persons with disabilities.”95 He uses the classic language of civil 
 
 91. The court stated: 
The evidence before Congress when it enacted Title II of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act established that physical barriers in government buildings, including 
courthouses and in the courtrooms themselves, have had the effect of denying disabled 
people the opportunity to access vital services and to exercise fundamental rights 
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause. . . . 
. . . The record demonstrated that public entities’ failure to accommodate the needs of 
qualified persons with disabilities may result directly from unconstitutional animus 
and impermissible stereotypes. Title II ensures that the refusal to accommodate an 
individual with a disability is genuinely based on unreasonable cost or actual inability 
to accommodate, not on inconvenience or unfounded concerns about costs.  
Id. at 682–83. 
 92. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 513 (2004). Contrast the Court’s later formulation 
of the issue in United States v. Georgia (Goodman): “We consider whether a disabled inmate in 
a state prison may sue the State for money damages under Title II of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act . . . .” 126 S. Ct. 877, 878 (2006). For a discussion of this case, see infra notes 
181–88 and accompanying text. 
 93. Lane, 541 U.S. at 509. 
 94. Id. at 515. 
 95. Id. at 516. 
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rights in presenting the congressional findings in enacting the ADA, 
namely, that people with disabilities are a “discrete and insular 
minority” subjected to “purposeful unequal treatment,” politically 
powerless and stereotyped.96  
Under Supreme Court precedent, federal statutes that abrogate 
state sovereign immunity are subject to a two-step analysis.97 
Congress must first express unequivocally its intention to abrogate 
immunity,98 and it did so clearly in the ADA.99 In addition, Congress 
must act subject to a valid exercise of its section 5 enforcement 
power in the Fourteenth Amendment.100 As described by Justice 
Stevens, this enforcement power is a “broad power indeed.”101 It 
reaches beyond prophylactic efforts to end practices with 
discriminatory intent, and even beyond the enforcement of rights 
specifically protected by the text of the Fourteenth Amendment.102 
This characterization relies on Nevada Department of Human 
Resources v. Hibbs, in which the Court upheld the dependent care 
provisions of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) against a 
defense of sovereign immunity:  
We upheld the FMLA as a valid exercise of Congress’ § 5 
power to combat unconstitutional sex discrimination, even 
though there was no suggestion that the State’s leave policy 
was adopted or applied with a discriminatory purpose that 
would render it unconstitutional . . . . When Congress seeks to 
 
 96. Id. Compare the Court’s description in Cleburne of government treatment of people 
with disabilities:  
[T]he distinctive legislative response, both national and state, to the plight of those 
who are mentally retarded demonstrates not only that they have unique problems, but 
also that the lawmakers have been addressing their difficulties in a manner that belies a 
continuing antipathy or prejudice and a corresponding need for more intrusive 
oversight by the judiciary. 
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 443 (1985). Here, the Court views 
people with mental retardation as largely in need of protection and sees government efforts 
directed towards them as largely protective. The ADA was in part a response to the rose-
colored glasses of Cleburne. 
 97. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 517. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See 42 U.S.C. § 12202 (2000). 
 100. Lane, 541 U.S. at 517.  
 101. Id. at 518 (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 732 (1982)). 
 102. Id. at 518–19.  
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remedy or prevent unconstitutional discrimination, § 5 
authorizes it to enact prophylactic legislation proscribing 
practices that are discriminatory in effect, if not in intent, to 
carry out the basic objectives of the Equal Protection Clause.103 
Congress’s enforcement powers are “not, however, unlimited.”104 
Under Supreme Court precedent the limits of Congress’s powers are 
set by “congruence and proportionality” between the injury identified 
and its purported remedy.105  
In Garrett, the relevant precedent, the Supreme Court had applied 
a congruence and proportionality analysis to conclude that Congress 
did not properly exercise its section 5 enforcement powers in 
permitting suits against state governments for violations of Title I of 
the ADA (the employment discrimination title).106 In prohibiting 
employment discrimination, Congress had sought to enforce the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection.107 
Classifications based on disability are subject to a rational basis 
test.108 In enacting Title I of the ADA, however, Congress did not 
have extensive evidence that states had been engaging in patterns of 
unconstitutional employment discrimination.109 Nearly all of 
Congress’s evidence about disability discrimination referred to the 
provision of public services, according to the Court.110 For all 
 
 103. 538 U.S. 721, 727–28 (2003). This citation is potentially disingenuous, since 
categorization based on sex is given heightened scrutiny, which the Court has specifically 
rejected for categorization based on disability, and the Court in Hibbs specifically referred to 
this heightened standard of scrutiny. Id. at 728. Categorization based on disability has been 
given only rational basis scrutiny since Cleburne. See Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 366 
(2001). The Court’s justification for relying on a heightened scrutiny standard, however, is that 
under a due process analysis it is the protection of rights that warrants heightened scrutiny. See 
Lane, 541 U.S. at 523. 
 104. Id. at 520. Note the double negative language, suggesting that the admission that 
Congress’s powers are limited is grudging. 
 105. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997), superseded by statute, 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 
803. 
 106. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365.  
 107. Id. at 368.  
 108. Lane, 541 U.S. at 540. 
 109. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370 (“It is telling, we think, that given these large numbers, 
Congress assembled only such minimal evidence of unconstitutional state discrimination in 
employment against the disabled.”). 
 110. Lane, 541 U.S. at 521. 
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Congress knew, states might well have good reasons, rather than a 
discriminatory animus, for differential classifications based on 
disability; Congress, in the Garrett Court’s judgment, was creating 
new rights rather than enforcing existing ones.111 
By contrast, Justice Stevens reasons in Lane that Title II of the 
ADA not only prohibits classifications based on disability that “lack a 
rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose,” but also 
seeks to “enforce a variety of other basic constitutional 
guarantees.”112 Some of these guarantees are protected by the Due 
Process Clause in the sense of access to process: access to courts, the 
right to confront accusers, the meaningful opportunity to be heard, 
the right to trial by jury, and the First Amendment right of access to 
criminal proceedings.113 Other guarantees of rights involve protection 
against “pervasive unequal treatment in the administration of state 
services and programs, including systematic deprivations of 
fundamental rights.”114 It is important to note the Court’s language: 
the Court uses “including,” which implies a non-exclusive list is to 
follow. The list then continues by adding other rights: voting, 
marrying, and serving as jurors, protection against unjustified 
commitment, protection against abuse and neglect in state mental 
health hospitals, and even Cleburne’s protection against “irrational 
discrimination in zoning decisions.”115 In support of this non-
exclusive list, the Court notes that “[t]he decisions of other courts, 
too, document a pattern of unequal treatment in the administration of 
a wide range of public services, programs, and activities, including 
the penal system, public education, and voting. Notably, these 
decisions also demonstrate a pattern of unconstitutional treatment in 
the administration of justice.”116  
 
 111. Id. at 526. 
 112. Id. at 522. 
 113. Id. at 523. 
 114. Id. at 524. 
 115. Id. at 525 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)). 
 116. Id. In this discussion, several of the Court’s citations are especially noteworthy. The 
Court cites Cleburne for a general prohibition against irrational discrimination in zoning, not 
for the conclusion that in the particular circumstances of the case the zoning was irrational. Id. 
The Court also approvingly cites Ruth Colker and Adam Milani, scholars well-known for their 
work against discrimination against people with disabilities, for their “comprehensive 
discussion of the shortcomings of state disability discrimination statutes.” Id. at 526 n.15.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol23/iss1/3
p33 Francis Silvers book pages.doc  3/29/2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2007]  A New Start on the Road Not Taken 53 
 
 
Before applying the congruence and proportionality analysis to 
the services in Lane itself, Justice Stevens pauses to respond to 
Justice Rehnquist’s dissenting opinion.117 Justice Rehnquist found 
insufficient evidentiary support for Congress’s prophylactic action 
against discrimination in the provision of public services.118 To 
Justice Rehnquist’s concern that some of the evidence before 
Congress involved non-state actors, Justice Stevens replied that the 
“sheer volume” of the evidence was enormous.119 The Court also 
favorably compared the evidence available to Congress in passing the 
ADA with the evidence available to Congress in enacting the FMLA, 
which had been upheld against a sovereign immunity challenge.120 
This comparison contained a subtle reply to Justice Rehnquist’s 
complaint that Title II of the ADA could not pass the rational basis 
test: 
Title II is aimed at the enforcement of a variety of basic rights, 
including the right of access to the courts at issue in this case, 
that call for a standard of judicial review at least as searching, 
and in some cases more searching, than the standard that 
applies to sex-based classifications.121  
Thus, it is the rights at issue—not the classifications—that require 
more searching scrutiny than the rational basis test.122 Hibbs, the 
FMLA case, is not inapposite because classifications based on sex 
command heightened scrutiny123: rights-denials command heightened 
scrutiny, too. 
It is only after this broad portrayal of Congress’s section 5 powers 
to guarantee due process, as well as of the evidence available to 
Congress, and the reply to Justice Rehnquist that due process 
heightens the level of scrutiny, that the Court turns to analyze the 
congruence and proportionality of Title II as a response “to this 
 
 117. Id. at 527 n.16. 
 118. Id. at 541–43 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 119. Id. at 528 (majority opinion). 
 120. Id.  
 121. Id. at 529. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 528.  
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history and pattern of unequal treatment.”124 At this point, the Court 
limits the scope of its inquiry, first, to “whether Congress had the 
power under § 5 to enforce the constitutional right of access to the 
courts.”125 The Court concludes that, given the right at issue and the 
evidence, Congress “unquestionably” had the power and that the 
Court’s analysis on this point “need go no further.”126 Only at this 
point does the Court set aside the question of whether Congress had 
the power under Title II to prohibit discrimination in any and all 
public services and narrow the issue to access to the courts: “the 
question presented in this case is not whether Congress can validly 
subject the States to private suits for money damages for failing to 
provide reasonable access to hockey rinks, or even to voting 
booths.”127  
This is the passage—that the question is not hockey rinks or even 
voting—that some subsequent cases have relied on for the narrow 
interpretation of Lane: that Lane holds that Congress’s valid exercise 
of section 5 enforcement powers extends only to the guarantee of 
access to courts.128 To be sure, the Court is at pains here to clarify 
that it is addressing court services specifically; this is its response to 
the dissenting opinions, discussed shortly. To interpret this passage as 
a negative pregnant (that is, as implying that Congress’s enforcement 
power does not extend beyond access to the courts), however would 
belie all of the text of the opinion that comes before. Lane, by its 
terms, is a holding about Congress’s section 5 enforcement powers 
with respect to access to courts. It is not and should not be read as a 
holding about the limits of these powers in other cases.  
The remedy selected—reasonable measures to make courtrooms 
accessible and reasonable modifications that do not fundamentally 
alter the nature of the services for persons who are otherwise eligible 
for these services—is the final aspect of the “congruence and 
proportionality” analysis.129 The Lane Court finds that the remedy is 
proportional; the state is not required to adopt measures that are 
 
 124. Id. at 530. 
 125. Id. at 531. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 530–31. 
 128. See infra note 205 and accompanying text.  
 129. Lane, 541 U.S. at 530.  
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unreasonably costly, to compromise the fundamental nature of the 
service, or to open the service to people who are not otherwise 
eligible.130 Here, too, the Court limits the scope of what it says: 
“Because this case implicates the right of access to the courts, we 
need not consider whether Title II’s duty to accommodate exceeds 
what the Constitution requires in the class of cases that implicate only 
Cleburne’s prohibition on irrational discrimination.”131 This limit, 
too, must be read against the background of the full opinion. The 
Court has determined that the right of access to the courts is a due 
process right that warrants a heightened scrutiny analysis.132 Other 
state services may or may not implicate rights that warrant 
heightened scrutiny; the Court is not expressing an opinion either on 
this point or on whether Title II more generally could survive a 
rational basis test analysis. These questions remain open. They are 
not foreclosed in Lane, despite what later courts might have said. 
Moreover, the Court in Lane has certainly suggested that there are 
other rights to which a due process analysis might be applied.133 
Lane was neither univocal nor unanimous. The concurrences 
emphasized its expansiveness and elucidated aspects of this. Justice 
Souter’s concurring opinion, joined by Justice Ginsburg, pointed out 
that of all governmental institutions, the courts should applaud the 
use of section 5 to address the situation of people with disabilities 
before the courts, given the courts’ own histories of discrimination 
against people with disabilities.134 Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence, 
joined by Justices Souter and Breyer, construes the goal of the ADA 
as advancing equal citizenship for people with disabilities.135 
Achieving inclusiveness despite differences, Justice Ginsburg 
contends, may require a more comprehensive understanding of 
discrimination that extends to failures to provide reasonable 
accommodation.136 
 
 130. Id. at 532. 
 131. Id. at 533 n.20.  
 132. Id. at 522–23. 
 133. Id. at 524 (including voting, marrying, and serving as jurors). 
 134. Id. at 534–35 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter cites Justice Marshall’s Cleburne 
dissent for the history of unequal treatment of people with disabilities. Id. at 535 n.1. 
 135. Id. at 536 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 136. Id. at 537. Justice Ginsburg relies principally on the subordination account of 
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Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent, joined by Justices Kennedy and 
Thomas, begins by advancing the narrow view of Lane: that it holds 
only that Congress permissibly abrogated state sovereign immunity 
as applied to the circumstances in Lane, that is, with respect to cases 
implicating the right of access to courts.137 Even this conclusion, in 
Justice Rehnquist’s view, is mistaken. Congress may act 
prophylactically under section 5 only to remedy identified 
constitutional violations, in a manner that is congruent and 
proportional.138 In his judgment, application of the congruence and 
proportionality test reveals that Congress redefined, rather than 
enforced, identified constitutional rights, even with regard to the 
situation in Lane.139 The constitutional rights relied on by the 
majority were rights exercised through access to the courts: the right 
to be present, to have a meaningful opportunity to be heard, the right 
to trial by jury, and the public’s First Amendment right of access to 
criminal proceedings.140 Justice Rehnquist contends, however, that 
Congress had insufficient evidence to support the claim that states 
were systematically violating these rights, and chose a 
disproportionate remedy.141  
Justice Rehnquist’s claims about the evidence reveal assumptions 
about disability and about the law. About disability, he dismisses 
evidence of discriminatory state action against people with 
disabilities by maintaining it is “outdated” and “generalized.”142 This 
optimism is, to say the least, put at issue by Justice Souter’s 
concurrence. About the law, in asserting that much of the evidence 
concerns non-state actors and is anecdotal at best, Justice Rehnquist 
reintroduces (from Garrett) his view of the rational basis test of 
Cleburne143 without noting specifically the significance of this move. 
As we have already argued, the majority opinion reasons instead that 
 
disability developed by Samuel Bagenstos, and on Olmstead’s holding that states were 
accountable for failures to provide community residential placements for people with 
disabilities. Id. at 536–37. 
 137. Id. at 538 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 138. Id. at 539.  
 139. Id. at 551.  
 140. Id. at 543. 
 141. Id. at 549. 
 142. Id. at 541. 
 143. Id. at 542–43. 
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the evidence meets the heightened level of scrutiny required when 
due process protects important rights.144 Moreover, in assessing the 
evidence considered by Congress, Justice Rehnquist construes the 
right at issue differently from the majority and on a case-by-case 
basis: as the actual denial of “the constitutional right to access a given 
judicial proceeding.”145 This construction of the right is critical to 
Justice Rehnquist’s contention that Congress has extended, rather 
than enforced, due process rights. 
Justice Rehnquist’s case-by-case construction of the right of 
access to courts also reveals his understanding of claims of illegal 
discrimination. One of the plaintiffs in Lane was able to make his 
way up the stairs into the courtroom by crawling; when he refused to 
crawl a second time, Tennessee offered to hold the hearing in an 
alternative location, which he also refused.146 The other plaintiff 
sought to function as a court reporter but could not enter various 
courtrooms.147 In both cases, Justice Rehnquist contends, the state 
had a rational basis for failing to alter the courthouses: the expense of 
modifications.148 When states act in this way, they are not 
“discriminating,” according to Chief Justice Rehnquist.149 To say that 
states are discriminating, he asserts, would be to allow plaintiffs to 
challenge “any sort of inconvenience.”150  
This is to misunderstand the claim to constitutional rights, 
however. The constitutional right at issue is the accessibility of courts 
to people with a variety of differences who may need to use the 
courts. The discrimination was a failure to design courts inclusively, 
not merely a failure to rig an alternative for a particular disabled 
person who might request one.151 In requiring only reasonable 
modifications to existing facilities, Congress both compromised and 
 
 144. Id. at 528–29 (majority opinion).  
 145. Id. at 546 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 146. Id. at 514 (majority opinion).  
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 547 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 553. 
 151. Two years after Lane refused to crawl up the stairs, Polk County installed an elevator 
in the courthouse. Bill Mears, Disabled Win Victory in Ruling Over Access to Government 
Buildings, CNN.COM, May 17, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/05/17/scotus.disabled/ 
index.html. 
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observed the structure of proportionality by taking into account the 
expenses of redesign. The result should not be to trivialize claims of 
discrimination as mere preferences or objections to inconvenience.  
Finally, Justice Rehnquist characterizes the remedy in Title II as 
disproportional because it requires “special accommodation and the 
elimination of programs that have a disparate impact on the disabled 
. . . .”152 Here, too, Justice Rehnquist paints a picture of special help, 
not of civil rights. Justice Rehnquist’s further objection is that Title II 
is far too broad in scope.153 Title II applies to all public services.154 
As we shall argue below, a due process analysis extends beyond the 
issue of access to courts involved in Lane. Given current Supreme 
Court jurisprudence, on even this analysis the permissible scope of 
Congress’s section 5 enforcement powers will not reach the full 
scope of Title II, however. Justice Rehnquist contends that the very 
fact of Title II’s broad scope should doom it because it will require 
states to defend a multitude of cases, public service by public service, 
from access to voting booths to access to hockey rinks.155 This, he 
contends, is a disproportional remedy.156 The starting place of his 
objection to Title II is his construction of Lane as simply an “as 
applied” holding,157 a picture we have criticized. But the cornerstone 
of the objection is that he does not accept how the majority’s due 
process analysis provides a principled basis for defining the scope of 
Congress’s section 5 enforcement powers as extending far more 
broadly than to access to courts. Our discussion will show how 
Lane’s due process analysis builds this principled basis while 
avoiding the flood of litigation that Justice Rehnquist feared. 
Justice Scalia’s dissent rejects the entire structure of the Supreme 
Court’s section 5 jurisprudence.158 He regards the Hibbs and Lane 
decisions as reductios of the “congruence and proportionality” test 
 
 152. Lane, 541 U.S. at 549. 
 153. Id. at 550–51. 
 154. Id. at 550.  
 155. Id. at 551 (“Title II . . . applies indiscriminately to all ‘services,’ ‘programs,’ or 
‘activities’ of any ‘public entity.’”). 
 156. Id. at 554.  
 157. Id. at 551–52. 
 158. Id. at 557–58 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The ‘congruence and proportionality’ standard, 
like all such flabby tests, is a standing invitation to judicial arbitrariness and policy-driven 
decisionmaking.”).  
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that the Court has developed for section 5 analysis.159 Justice Scalia 
maintains that the Court’s analyses in these cases reveal that the test 
is unprincipled.160 This contention, like the contentions in Justice 
Rehnquist’s dissent, reveals how Justice Scalia understands disability 
and the law. In Justice Scalia’s view, Congress may only use its 
section 5 power to enforce rights explicitly enumerated in the 
Fourteenth Amendment itself,161 such as the authorization of a cause 
of action against persons for violating constitutional rights or the 
implementation of reporting requirements designed to bring such 
rights violations to light.162 The initial Court decisions approving 
broader congruent and proportional prophylactic measures, so long as 
they were congruent and proportional, involved allegations of racial 
discrimination by states, the “principal evil” the Fourteenth 
Amendment sought to cure.163 Moreover, at the time of these 
decisions, the incorporation doctrine had not been developed and the 
understanding of the rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment 
was thereby quite limited. These points lead Justice Scalia to 
continue to accept the congruence and proportionality test for cases 
alleging racial discrimination, but not for any other kinds of cases.164 
Justice Scalia thus rejects any analogy between racial discrimination 
and discrimination based on other categorizations.165 Rejection of this 
analogy leads him to refuse to consider whether prophylactic action 
might be as necessary when states categorize on grounds other than 
race.166 
III. AFTER LANE, IN THE COURTS 
Lane came as a surprise to many commentators, who had feared 
the Court would apply its rejectionist analysis of Title I in blanket 
fashion to Title II.167 Both before and after Lane, the lower federal 
 
 159. Id. at 555–58.  
 160. Id. at 558. 
 161. Id. at 559–60. Thus Justice Scalia endorses 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. 
 162. Id. at 560. 
 163. Id. at 563. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id.  
 166. Id. 
 167. See, e.g., Russell Powell, Beyond Lane: Who Is Protected by the Americans with 
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courts had been grappling with many kinds of Title II suits, including 
suits by disabled prisoners claiming rights to accommodations,168 
suits by students claiming disability discrimination by state 
universities,169 and suits claiming rights to state services such as 
Medicaid.170  
At the time of the Lane decision, several cases in which disabled 
prisoners had sued under Title II were pending before the lower 
federal courts.171 These cases are difficult for the already-
unsympathetic plaintiffs, both because the state can claim a rational 
basis for restrictions that protect safety and because courts defer to 
these legislative and executive judgments. On the other hand, at least 
some rights claims by prisoners rest directly on the Eighth 
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment and thus are 
based on constitutional rights akin to the due process right of access 
to courts.172 In several of these prisoner suits, appellate courts read 
Lane as limited to the right of access to courts and therefore as not 
extending Title II’s coverage.173 These courts undertook congruence 
and proportionality analyses, concluding that Congress had 
overstepped its section 5 authority by prohibiting disability 
discrimination in prison services.174 
The Supreme Court decided one of these cases, United States v. 
Georgia (Goodman),175 about a year and a half after Lane. Tony 
Goodman, a paraplegic inmate, brought suit challenging the 
conditions of his confinement, seeking, among other claims, to 
 
Disabilities Act, Who Should Be?, 82 DENV. U. L. REV. 25, 37 n.135 (2004). 
 168. E.g., Cochran v. Pinchak, 401 F.3d 184 (3d Cir. 2005), vacated and reh’g granted by 
412 F.3d 500 (3d Cir. 2005); Miller v. King, 384 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2004), vacated, 449 F.3d 
1149 (11th Cir. 2006).  
 169. E.g., Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Scis. Ctr. of Brooklyn, 280 F.3d 98, 109 (2d Cir. 
2001).  
 170. Circuits were also split on issues such as whether suits could be brought under Title II 
against states charging for disabled parking placards. Compare Thompson v. Colorado, 278 
F.3d 1020 (10th Cir. 2001) (no valid abrogation for a $2.25 charge), and Brown v. N.C. Div. of 
Motor Vehicles, 166 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999) (no valid abrogation for a $5 charge), with Dare 
v. California, 191 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 1999) (valid abrogation of the state’s sovereign immunity 
defense to a claim that a $6 biennial charge violated ADA Title II).  
 171. E.g., Cochran, 401 F.3d 184; Miller, 384 F.3d 1248.  
 172. See United States v. Georgia (Goodman), 126 S. Ct. 877, 881 (2006).  
 173. See Cochran, 401 F.3d at 193; Miller, 384 F.3d at 1277–78.  
 174. Cochran, 401 F.3d at 191; Miller, 384 F.3d at 1269. 
 175. Goodman, 126 S. Ct. 877. 
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recover money damages from the state of Georgia for violations of 
Title II of the ADA.176 Goodman asserted that he was unable to turn 
his wheelchair in his cell, was forced to sit in his own waste because 
he could not use the toilet facilities provided, and that prison guards 
had ignored his medical needs.177 The district court granted summary 
judgment to the state, holding that Goodman’s Title II claims were 
barred by sovereign immunity.178 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, 
holding that, under Lane, Congress’s extension of Title II to prison 
services was not a proper exercise of its section 5 enforcement 
powers.179 
In Goodman, Justice Scalia wrote a limited decision for a 
unanimous Court.180 He stated the issue narrowly: “[w]hether a 
disabled inmate in a state prison may sue the State for money 
damages under Title II” of the ADA181 and “whether Title II of the 
ADA validly abrogates state sovereign immunity with respect to the 
claims at issue here.”182 Because the state of Georgia did not contest 
Goodman’s claim that there had been Eighth Amendment violations, 
Justice Scalia characterized Goodman’s claims for money damages 
under the ADA as “evidently based, at least in large part, on conduct 
that independently violated the provisions of § 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”183 Justice Scalia’s analysis proceeds on this basis, 
 
 176. Id. at 879. 
 177. Id. at 880.  
 178. Id. 
 179. Miller, 384 F.3d at 1276–78. This decision had given Lane the narrowest possible 
reading, reading it solely as an “as applied” case. Id. at 1271 n.26. It identified the right at issue 
as the Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 1272. It 
opined that the Lane Court had “little documentation” of a history of discrimination in prisons, 
but conceded that the Court had resolved that issue. Id. at 1271 n.25. However, it concluded that 
the remedy of Title II was not “congruent and proportional” to the discrimination Congress had 
found, because the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment is a “markedly narrow 
restriction on prison administrative conduct” and does not affect the wide range of prison 
services and programs. Id. at 1247. The Eighth Amendment prohibits the wanton infliction of 
pain on inmates, in the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning, but not exclusion of prisoners with 
disabilities from most prison services. Id. at 1275. 
 180. Goodman, 126 S. Ct. at 878.  
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 880. 
 183. Id. at 881. This is a non sequitur, as the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling on remand 
recognizes. Some refusals to provide access to prison services to people with disabilities, such 
as refusal to provide medical care, clearly are also Eighth Amendment violations. Other refusals 
to provide access to people with disabilities may not be, on the other hand. If prisons are not 
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establishing an important caveat to the opinion’s significance. Justice 
Scalia’s dissent in Lane had made clear his view that Congress may 
not act prophylactically but may only act under section 5 to enforce 
explicit constitutional guarantees enumerated in the Fourteenth 
Amendment.184 Although this particular view is unique to Justice 
Scalia, no Justices, he says, now doubt that Congress may go at least 
this far.185 Justice Scalia’s opinion concludes: “Thus, insofar as Title 
II creates a private cause of action for damages against the States for 
conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment, Title II 
validly abrogates state sovereign immunity.”186 
The Supreme Court’s order to the Eleventh Circuit on remand 
clearly indicates that Justice Scalia’s opinion should not be taken to 
establish a negative pregnant, however. The order directs the 
Eleventh Circuit to direct the district court to determine, claim by 
claim, which of Goodman’s allegations violates the ADA, which of 
these also violate the Fourteenth Amendment, and whether the claims 
that violate the ADA but not the Fourteenth Amendment are claims 
for which Congress validly abrogated state sovereign immunity.187 
As Justices Stevens and Ginsburg noted in concurrence, the Court’s 
decision does not define the outer limits of sovereign immunity, but 
“wisely” permits the lower courts to sort out a very messy factual 
record.188  
It is presently unclear whether the Eleventh Circuit or other lower 
courts facing similar questions will be willing to entertain the 
possibility that Congress validly abrogated sovereign immunity for 
prison programs generally189 or in the case of other rights.190 In 
 
required by the Eighth Amendment to provide certain educational services, it would not violate 
the Eighth Amendment for the prison to offer these services to inmates generally but not to 
provide, for example, hearing assistance to deaf prisoners who are otherwise qualified for the 
services but cannot take advantage of them because of deafness. 
 184. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 557–58 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 185. Goodman, 126 S. Ct. at 881. 
 186. Id. at 882. 
 187. Id.  
 188. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 189. Miller v. King, 449 F.3d 1149 (11th Cir. 2006). The earlier decision in Miller was 
vacated in light of Goodman. Id. at 1150. The Eleventh Circuit’s directions to the district court 
followed the guidelines in Justice Scalia’s opinion but expressed no specific opinion on whether 
the district court should limit abrogation of sovereign immunity to claims violating the Eighth 
Amendment. Id. at 1151. 
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prisoner’s rights cases there may be allegations of clear Eighth 
Amendment violations such as the refusal to provide medical care 
because of a disability. There may also be allegations of Title II 
violations that do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation, 
such as a failure to make recreational opportunities accessible to 
prisoners with disabilities. The First Circuit appears to have read 
Lane and Goodman to establish the negative pregnant that, in cases of 
prisoners’ complaints about disability discrimination, only Eighth 
Amendment violations can be the basis for valid abrogation of 
sovereign immunity.191  
The Sixth Circuit also appears to have construed the cases as 
limited to their circumstances.192 Rachel Haas sought to sue multiple 
defendants under ADA Title II for her sentence to a drug and alcohol 
rehabilitation facility that required her to ascend six floors of stairs to 
reach her room, even though she was forced to crawl due to serious 
injuries she suffered in an accident.193 In the case, the Sixth Circuit 
 
 190. Some commentators have framed this as whether Lane and Goodman are “as applied” 
rulings. See, e.g., Meredith S. Byars, Comment, The Supreme Court’s Section 5 Analysis in 
Tennessee v. Lane: Considering the Future of State Sovereignty, Public Policy, and the 
Treatment Needs of Mentally Ill Prisoners, 80 TUL. L. REV. 947 (2006); David L. Schwan, 
Note, “When You Come to a Fork in the Road, Take It!”: Tennessee v. Lane Takes a New 
Approach to Section Five Enforcement Powers, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 235 (2006). 
 191. The First Circuit characterized Lane as “as applied”: “holding that ‘Title II, as it 
applies to the class of cases implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts, constitutes 
a valid exercise of Congress’ § 5 authority to enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.’” Kiman v. N.H. Dep’t of Corr., 451 F.3d 274, 281 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting 
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533 (2004)). It also quotes language from Goodman that 
suggests the negative pregnant implication: “‘insofar as Title II creates a private cause of action 
for damages against the States for conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment, 
Title II validly abrogates state sovereign immunity.’” Id. (quoting Goodman, 126 S. Ct. at 882). 
 192. Haas v. Quest Recovery Servs., Inc., No. 05-3147, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 7570 (6th 
Cir. Mar. 27, 2006). 
 193. Id. at *2–*3. In the case, Haas raised a complex set of federal and state claims against 
the state, the facility, and various individual defendants. Id. at *6. The count relevant here is an 
ADA count against the State of Ohio, which had two alleged bases: the action of an arm of the 
state (the municipal court) in sentencing Haas to the treatment facility, and the state’s 
ownership of the building in which the facility was located (the facility leased the building from 
the state). Id. at *8–*9. The district court ruled that both of these claims were deficient and that, 
in any event, the state would be entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. at *9–*13. The 
count against the municipal court for sentencing Haas to the facility was, in reality a challenge 
to the order of the judge and thus came within the protection of judicial immunity. Id. at *10–
*11. The claim against the state as landlord was deficient because Hass did not argue 
sufficiently that the facility was acting as an arm of the state. Id. at *11–*13. Perhaps because 
this analysis would appear to leave open the question of whether the state had violated the ADA 
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read Lane as “expressly limited” to the question of access to courts, 
and thus as not providing relevant guidance.194 Haas was thus forced 
to argue her case against the state on equal protection grounds.195 
This was a losing strategy given the Sixth Circuit’s view that alleged 
equal protection violations do not warrant abrogation of sovereign 
immunity because disability as a category demands only rational 
basis scrutiny, a view reached by the Sixth Circuit without further 
examination of whether the state in fact had a rational basis for the 
implicit categorizations it employed.196 The United States Supreme 
Court granted certiorari in Haas, vacated the Sixth Circuit’s 
judgment, and remanded for consideration of whether, under 
Goodman, the court had properly held that Haas failed to state a 
claim for relief under ADA Title II.197 
Lower courts have also disagreed over whether students claiming 
discrimination by state higher education institutions198 may bring suit 
under Title II without being barred by sovereign immunity. Access to 
higher education is not a right enumerated in the Constitution or 
otherwise given fundamental constitutional status.199 It is, however, 
an important means of social inclusion; discrimination in public 
education was a core focus of congressional attention in the findings 
that led to the ADA.200 In a pre-Lane case brought by a student 
claiming disability discrimination in his dismissal from a state 
medical school, the Second Circuit held that sovereign immunity is 
validly abrogated if there is an allegation of discriminatory animus, 
applying an equal protection “rational basis” analysis to Title II.201  
 
by leasing an inaccessible property to a facility not acting as an arm of the state, the district 
court opinion completed its analysis of the Eleventh Amendment immunity issue for ADA 
claims against states outside of the circumstances of access to courts.  
 194. Id. at *15.  
 195. Id. at *16. 
 196. Id. at *16–*18. 
 197. See Haas v. Quest Recovery Servs., Inc., No. 06-263, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 1150 (Jan. 16, 
2007). 
 198. See, e.g., Ass’n for Disabled Ams., Inc. v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 405 F.3d 954 (11th Cir. 
2005); Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Scis. Ctr. of Brooklyn, 280 F.3d 98, 109 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 199. Handberry v. Thompson, 446 F.3d 335, 352 (2d Cir. 2006) (“The Fourteenth 
Amendment does not protect a public education as a substantive fundamental right.”). 
 200. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 525 (2004). 
 201. Garcia, 280 F.3d at 109.  
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The court interpreted the rational basis test leniently: state statutes 
are presumed to be constitutional; any conceivable set of facts will 
support that presumption; and a challenger must refute all 
conceivable sets of such facts.202 Because Title II requires reasonable 
modifications unless they would work a fundamental alteration in a 
state program, it disallows many reasons that states might have for 
treating people with disabilities unequally, even reasons that are hard-
headed or hard-hearted. It thus goes too far. But actual discriminatory 
animus cannot ever be a justifiable state reason, so suits based on this 
allegation may go forward.203  
Realizing that evidence of discriminatory animus may be difficult 
for the plaintiff to unearth, the Second Circuit allows a burden-
shifting analysis.204 If the plaintiff can produce prima facie evidence 
of animus, the burden shifts to the state to produce a reasonable basis 
for its action, but the plaintiff must then bear the ultimate burden of 
persuasion on the issue of animus.205 The court recognizes that this 
analysis differs from its general approach to application of the 
rational basis test,206 because it does not require the plaintiff to refute 
every conceivable reason that the state might have had for its action. 
It accepts this result, however, because it believes the aim of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was to root out discriminatory animus.207 If 
the plaintiff can advance evidence of a bad state motive, the state 
should at least have to answer it, although the ultimate burden of 
proving the bad motive rests on the plaintiff.208 Thus the Second 
Circuit, although not recognizing Title II as a rights-protective 
statute, does realize that government actions that treat disabled people 
 
 202. Id.; see also Harris v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, 419 F. Supp. 2d 530 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); 
Press v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Stony Brook, 388 F. Supp. 2d 127 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 203. Garcia, 280 F.3d at 111. 
 204. Id. at 109–10. 
 205. The Second Circuit does, however, have a post-Lane and post-Goodman holding that 
education is not a fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause. See Handberry v. 
Thompson, 446 F.3d 335 (2d Cir. 2006). Moreover, one district court decision asserted that 
Goodman modified Lane by moving from a Boerne congruence and proportionality test to an 
actual violation of a constitutional right test. See Degrafinreid v. Ricks, 417 F. Supp. 2d 403, 
410 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 206. Garcia, 280 F.3d at 110. 
 207. Id. at 112. 
 208. Id. 
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differently may not be benevolent in intent.209 District court decisions 
in the Second Circuit after Lane are split on whether a narrow reading 
of Lane counsels rejection of the Garcia animus strategy on 
sovereign immunity grounds.210 
By contrast, the Eleventh and Fourth Circuits have held that states 
may be sued under Title II of the ADA for discrimination in the 
provision of services in public higher education. In the Eleventh 
Circuit case, Association for Disabled Americans, Inc. v. Florida 
International University, the plaintiffs sued Florida International 
University (FIU) for violating Title II of the ADA and the defendants 
claimed sovereign immunity.211 FIU allegedly failed to provide 
qualified sign language interpreters, other aids and services, and 
physical access to some programs for students with disabilities.212 
The theoretical structure of the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis was 
instructive, identifying the right at issue in Title II as protection 
against irrational disability discrimination.213 Lane applied due 
process analysis with a fundamental right at stake—access to 
courts—but Lane did not require a fundamental right to conclude that 
sovereign immunity had been properly abrogated.214 To be sure, 
under the Equal Protection Clause, differential classifications in 
education are subject to the rational basis test, but, according to the 
Eleventh Circuit, this is not the end of the story.215 Because education 
is so important to our basic institutions and has such a lasting impact 
it is not quite like other rights subject to rational basis review, 
according to the Eleventh Circuit.216 In making this claim, the 
 
 209. Garcia lost the case on summary judgment; however, a refusal to make a requested 
accommodation for a learning disability did not by itself show discriminatory animus. Garcia, 
280 F.3d at 112–13.  
 210. See, e.g., Press v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Stony Brook, 388 F. Supp. 2d 127 (E.D.N.Y. 
2005). A district court in the Seventh Circuit agreed with Press. See Doe v. Bd. of Trs., 429 F. 
Supp. 2d 930 (N.D. Ill. 2006). 
 211. Ass’n for Disabled Ams., Inc. v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 405 F.3d 954, 956 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 957. 
 214. Id. at 957 n.2. 
 215. Id. at 959. 
 216. Id. (“Discrimination against disabled students in education affects disabled persons’ 
future ability to exercise and participate in the most basic rights and responsibilities of 
citizenship . . . .”).  
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Eleventh Circuit relies on Brown v. Board of Education.217 Congress 
found a history of discrimination in public education and the Lane 
court described this history, together with a history of litigation 
involving discrimination in education, as a critical example of 
discrimination in public services.218 Finally, the Court found that 
Title II was a proportional remedy, since it was limited to 
discrimination on the basis of disability and did not otherwise 
impinge on states’ discretion to differentiate for other lawful 
reasons.219  
In the Fourth Circuit case, Constantine v. Rectors and Visitors of 
George Mason University, a law student sued George Mason 
University for damages for failing to accommodate her intractable 
migraine headache syndrome in a final exam.220 George Mason 
argued that the suit was barred by sovereign immunity.221 The Fourth 
Circuit relied on Florida International, but reasoned somewhat 
differently.222 It characterized the congruence and proportionality 
analysis of Lane as guiding but not resolving the question of Title II’s 
application to public services in higher education.223 Lane, by its 
terms, only resolves the application of Title II to access to the 
courts.224 The analysis in Lane allows prophylactic legislation that 
prohibits state conduct that is not unconstitutional, but that reaches 
beyond the explicit rights of the Fourth Amendment.225  
Applying this analysis to public higher education, the Fourth 
Circuit identifies the right enforced by Title II as protection against 
irrational discrimination based on disability, that is, as the right to 
equal protection.226 According to the court, education is not a 
 
 217. Id. at 957–58. 
 218. Id. at 958–59. 
 219. Id. at 959. For an argument that the Florida International decision correctly read Lane 
broadly, see Camille L. Zentner, Note, Between the Hockey Rink and the Voting Booth: The 
ADA and Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity in the Educational Context, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 
589 (2005). 
 220. Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 478 (4th Cir. 
2005). 
 221. Id. at 479. 
 222. Id. at 490.  
 223. Id. at 486. 
 224. Id. at 488. 
 225. Id. at 484–85.  
 226. Id. at 486.  
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fundamental right so disparities of treatment are subject to the 
rational basis test of equal protection analysis.227 Nonetheless, Title 
II’s response to pervasive, unconstitutional discrimination in the 
provision of public services includes prophylactic measures.228 The 
inclusion of a prohibition on disability discrimination in public higher 
education is such a proper prophylactic, according to the Fourth 
Circuit, because it is a limited requirement.229 States are only required 
to make reasonable modifications; they are not required to alter 
programs fundamentally or to undertake expensive structural changes 
to existing facilities if other methods of accommodation are less 
financially burdensome.230 While the court acknowledges that these 
requirements go beyond the Fourteenth Amendment, the court also 
holds that they are proportional to the requirement to root out 
irrational discrimination in public higher education.231 The court’s 
model is Olmstead, not Garrett.232 The Fourth Circuit, therefore, 
finds that broader prophylactics may be enacted to guard against 
discrimination that is irrational233; its analysis is based on the rational 
basis test applied to allegations of disability discrimination under the 
Equal Protection Clause, not on any form of heightened scrutiny. 
Other circuits have addressed sovereign immunity defenses on a 
range of important public services. For example, the Eighth Circuit, 
relying on a narrow construction of Lane, held that sovereign 
immunity was not properly abrogated in a suit alleging that 
Nebraska’s refusal to fund community-based Medicaid services was a 
violation of Title II of the ADA.234 The Supreme Court vacated and 
remanded the decision, instructing the Eighth Circuit to follow the 
Goodman analysis of whether the claim alleged the violation of a 
constitutional right and, if it alleged a Title II violation that was not 
also a violation of a constitutional right, whether sovereign immunity 
 
 227. Id. at 486–87.  
 228. Id. at 487. 
 229. Id. at 488–89. 
 230. Id.  
 231. Id. at 489. 
 232. Id.; see also Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999). 
 233. Constantine, 411 F.3d at 487 & 488 n.10.  
 234. See Bill M. ex rel. William M. v. Neb. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. Fin. & 
Support, 408 F.3d 1096 (8th Cir. 2005), vacated and remanded sub nom. by United States v. 
Neb. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. Fin. & Support, 126 S. Ct. 1826 (2006).  
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had been properly abrogated.235 This order at least suggests room for 
discussion of the justifiability of abrogation of sovereign immunity in 
the absence of an explicit constitutional right. However, the plaintiffs 
in the case decided not to pursue this particular claim.236  
A district court decision in the First Circuit has refused to 
abrogate sovereign immunity in a claim for public mental health 
services under Title II of the ADA.237 Additionally, a district court in 
the Seventh Circuit has considered whether a state’s failure to 
provide access to public transportation is a proper basis for the 
abrogation of state sovereign immunity.238 In analyzing this question, 
the district court carefully distinguished differential treatment that 
might impinge on a fundamental right to interstate travel from the 
asserted right to travel on public transportation.239 According to the 
district court, the state is not obligated to provide public transit, but if 
it does, it must provide it in a manner that is free of irrational 
disability discrimination.240 Where there is not a fundamental right, 
the rational basis test applies and expenses that are burdensome to the 
state can meet that test. This district court explicitly compared public 
transportation to education in importance, and joined those courts that 
have rejected the position that Title II validly abrogates sovereign 
immunity with respect to access to education.241  
In sum, after Lane, and especially after Goodman, the lower 
federal courts are struggling with the extent to which claims under 
Title II must fall under explicit constitutional guarantees to avoid a 
defense of sovereign immunity. Some courts are hewing to a very 
narrow reading of Lane to uphold the defense. Other courts, however, 
are finding that sovereign immunity is abrogated when important, 
albeit not enumerated, rights such as education are at stake, or when 
the state appears to have acted irrationally. Cleburne thus reappears, 
but with a twist: the sharp scrutiny afforded rights under Lane’s due 
 
 235. Nebraska, 126 S. Ct. at 1826. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Buchanan v. Maine, 377 F. Supp. 2d 276 (D. Me. 2005).  
 238. Everybody Counts, Inc. v. N. Ind. Reg’l Planning Comm’n, No. 2:98 CV 97, 2006 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39607, at *29 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 30, 2006). 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at *29–*30.  
 241. Id. at *39–*40. 
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process analysis can cut through many rationales about furthering 
states’ interests through incursions on the exercise of rights by people 
with disabilities. It is to the development of this strategy that we now 
turn.  
IV. FROM PROTECTING GROUPS TO PROTECTING RIGHTS 
The theme of beneficent treatment of mentally retarded people by 
the state is a strong presence throughout the Cleburne decision. It is 
used not only to explain holdings that government’s reasons for 
dealing differently with these citizens should be presumed to be 
benign, but also to assert that mentally retarded people must bear the 
burdens states place on them because of their differences. The claims 
about benefits and burdens appear to be tightly tied, as if the benefits 
of special provisions such as being exempted from federal civil 
service exams must be reciprocated by abandoning liberties or other 
rights. How heavy those burdens may be made to grow, what they 
may consist of, or how broadly they may extend before becoming 
illegitimate (or exceeding the worth of their reciprocal benefits), is 
unclear. In some places, the language suggests that only treatment the 
Constitution itself will not bear is prohibited to government in its 
dealings with mentally retarded people, so very heavy burdens may 
be imposed on them, but in other places the language assumes that 
burdens imposed legitimately by the state on mentally retarded 
people are just “incidental” ones.242 Whether the degree of burden is 
high or low, however, Cleburne appears to assume that some 
standard must exist to limit the burdens placed on the mentally 
retarded.  
 
 242. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985). In Cleburne 
the Supreme Court stated: 
To withstand equal protection review, legislation that distinguishes between the 
mentally retarded and others must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental 
purpose. This standard, we believe, affords government the latitude necessary both to 
pursue policies designed to assist the retarded in realizing their full potential, and to 
freely and efficiently engage in activities that burden the retarded in what is essentially 
an incidental manner. 
Id. 
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We can look to the context of Cleburne to discern the kind of 
standard presupposed. The district court in Cleburne held that the 
opportunity the zoning ordinance curtailed—that of living in a 
home—was not a fundamental right.243 But the Court of Appeals in 
Cleburne emphasized, and the Supreme Court did not demur, that a 
very important right, albeit not a fundamental one, was involved.244 
By refusing to permit mentally retarded citizens to occupy a group 
home, the city ordinance withheld an opportunity “which, although 
not fundamental, was very important to the mentally retarded.”245 
Without group homes, the Court of Appeals stated, “they can never 
hope to adapt” to life in the community.246 Little thought is needed to 
realize further that only by living in the community can citizens with 
mental retardation enjoy the fundamental liberty of associating with 
other citizens in valuable civic enterprises, a liberty previously 
stripped from them by oppressive institutionalization.  
Thus the history of differential state treatment of mentally 
retarded people, coupled with their biological differences, made the 
ability to occupy group homes very important to mentally retarded 
people’s liberty to exercise their fundamental right to associate with 
other people. For mentally retarded people, the important right is 
crucial to the fundamental right because for them the former is 
instrumental for the latter, just as a wheelchair-accessible courtroom 
is instrumental for those in wheelchairs to exercise their fundamental 
right to confront accusers. Given the instrumental importance of the 
right that would be lost immediately, and the fundamental nature of 
the right that subsequently would be lost, the city’s rationale for 
denial of community living to mentally retarded people was subjected 
to a substantially elevated standard.  
Once invocation of such a standard occurs, examination of the 
public interests at stake is unavoidable. The city at least should have 
been able to advance important reasons for denying such an 
 
 243. Id. at 437.  
 244. Id. at 437–38; see also Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc. v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 
199 (5th Cir. 1984) (“The Cleburne ordinance as applied withholds a benefit which, though not 
fundamental, is very important to the mentally retarded.”), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 473 
U.S. 432 (1985).  
 245. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 438. 
 246. Cleburne, 726 F.2d at 199. 
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important opportunity to citizens. It is the application of this standard 
by both the appellate court and the Supreme Court in Cleburne that 
exposes the extraordinary attenuation of the city’s rationale, laying 
bare at least three different indicators of the breadth of the city’s 
breach of equal protection. First, the city’s purported interest in 
protecting the plaintiffs from floods and schoolchildren did not cause 
it similarly to insulate other equally vulnerable groups. Second, the 
city’s worries about the potential for disruptive events did not cause it 
similarly to prohibit more likely disruptive groups. Third, the city’s 
responsiveness to a group of citizens who did not desire mentally 
retarded people as neighbors allowed one group of citizens to use the 
law as a tool for their bias against another group. 
Lane reveals a similar pattern. Access to courtrooms is an 
important right because it is instrumental for exercising the 
fundamental right to confront accusers. Thus, the state of Tennessee’s 
reasons for denying Lane the right of access, and in doing so 
eliminating his opportunity to exercise his right to confront his 
accusers, must appropriately further an important state interest. The 
interests asserted by the state ranged from the reluctance to modify 
historic buildings to the financial burdens of installing elevators and 
ramps.247 Beautification and budgets are no doubt legitimate state 
interests. But it is dubious at best to claim that they possess sufficient 
importance to eliminate the right of confrontation. It is comparatively 
unimaginable that a state would deny a defendant her right to 
confrontation because her trial exceeded the funds provided to 
operate the courts in the state’s annual budget, or because of the cost 
of installing a woman’s restroom in the courthouse, or that her right 
to trial by jury would be compromised because the jury members 
might damage the antique jury chairs. 
To exemplify denials of rights that demand and have received 
inspection, we need go no further than Lane itself. In Lane, the Court 
identifies a range of cases protecting important rights, including the 
 
 247. See Lane v. Tennessee, No. 3:98–0731, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25369, at *9–*11 
(M.D. Tenn. Aug. 17, 2004). Whether the state was overburdened by building an elevator might 
be assessed in light of the fact that two years after the incident that triggered Lane an elevator 
had been installed. Mears, supra note 151. 
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right to vote,248 the right to interstate travel,249 and the right to 
reproductive liberty,250 as well as rights that hew more closely to 
enumerated constitutional rights such as freedom of expression251 or 
the participation in judicial proceedings252 that was at stake in Lane. 
The Court states explicitly that the role of Title II is not only to 
enforce a “prohibition on irrational disability discrimination”—that 
is, to insist on a genuine rational basis for the state’s treatment of 
people with disabilities (or for that matter anyone else)—but also to 
“enforce a variety of other basic constitutional guarantees, 
infringements of which are subject to more searching judicial 
review.”253 The Court thus shifts the Title II analysis from people to 
their rights, and identifies many rights that call for careful inspection 
of the reasons if the rights are to be denied. 
Consider voting, which was the right at issue in the first of the 
Court’s citations, Dunn v. Blumstein.254 The state of Tennessee had 
insisted on a year-long residency requirement for voting.255 The 
lower court concluded that this requirement impermissibly interfered 
with the right to vote and created a “suspect classification” of the 
state’s new arrivals.256 The Supreme Court, however, never 
mentioned the classification question. Nor does it even refer to its 
earlier decisions upholding the Voting Rights Act as a proper 
exercise of Congress’s power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment—
that is, of Congress’s power to enforce the Reconstruction 
amendments because of the importance of guarding against 
discrimination.257  
Instead of looking at the need to protect a group against 
discrimination, the Court in Dunn rested its rejection of durational 
 
 248. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 520 (2004).  
 249. Id. at 523.  
 250. Id.  
 251. See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal. ex rel. County of Riverside, 478 U.S. 1, 
8–15 (1986).  
 252. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n.15 (1975); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 
U.S. 371, 379 (1971). 
 253. Lane, 541 U.S. at 522. 
 254. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). 
 255. Id. at 331.  
 256. Id. at 332. 
 257. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 
U.S. 301 (1966). 
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residency requirements on the importance of the rights at stake.258 
States may not impinge on these rights unless their restrictions are 
“necessary to promote a compelling state interest,” the standard 
format of heightened equal protection scrutiny.259 Voting is 
foundational to participation in a democratic society. Without the 
right to vote, people are excluded from having a say in the decisions 
that will govern their lives; the right to vote is thus implicit in the 
Constitution (and the Fifteenth Amendment clarifies that people may 
not be denied the vote on grounds of race260). In sum, voting is the 
right that is “preservative” of all other rights.261 
Interstate travel, which is burdened by a durational residency 
requirement, has long been recognized as essential to the structure of 
a federal society. The leading case protecting the right to travel is 
Shapiro v. Thompson,262 the second of the rights-protective cases 
cited in Lane. The plaintiffs in Shapiro claimed that durational 
residency requirements for welfare impermissibly burdened that right 
to interstate travel.263 The state claimed that the requirements were 
critical to protecting their “fiscal integrity.”264 The Court, although 
recognizing that statutes imposing waiting periods for welfare created 
different classifications of citizens, rejected the statute, resting its 
holding on the importance of interstate travel: 
This Court long ago recognized that the nature of our Federal 
Union and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite 
to require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the 
length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or 
regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this 
movement.265  
 
 258. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 336.  
 259. Id. at 337.  
 260. U.S. CONST. amend. XV. 
 261. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 336 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964)). 
 262. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
 263. Id. at 623.  
 264. Id. at 627.  
 265. Id. at 629. 
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The Court defended the right to travel in terms of personal liberty.266 
But it offered a deeper defense as well: that the nature of our political 
society—a “Federal Union”—requires recognition of this right.267 
The third rights-protective case cited in Lane protects people 
against involuntary sterilization. In Skinner v. Oklahoma, the 
petitioner challenged Oklahoma’s law requiring involuntary 
sterilization for “habitual criminals” convicted of offenses of “moral 
turpitude.”268 Someone convicted twice or more of crimes such as 
robbery—but not of embezzlement, which the state apparently did 
not regard as involving moral turpitude—could be sentenced to 
sterilization.269 The Court began its opinion simply: “This case 
touches a sensitive and important area of human rights.”270 It 
reinforces its argument that a sterilization law warranted strict 
scrutiny:  
We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the 
basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are 
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race. The 
power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far-reaching 
and devastating effects. In evil or reckless hands it can cause 
races or types which are inimical to the dominant group to 
wither and disappear. There is no redemption for the individual 
whom the law touches. Any experiment which the State 
conducts is to his irreparable injury. He is forever deprived of a 
basic liberty.271 
The likelihood that sterilization may be used against disfavored 
groups is at the forefront of the Court’s decision, but it is clear that 
these groups are not thought of only in racial terms; the Court refers 
to “types” of people and indeed cited the case in which the Court 
permitted sterilization of people believed to be mentally retarded.272 
At the forefront for the Court, however, is the importance of the 
 
 266. Id.  
 267. Id.  
 268. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942).  
 269. Id. at 537.  
 270. Id. at 536. 
 271. Id. at 541. 
 272. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
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rights themselves—to marry and have a family—to the individuals 
who might wish to exercise them.273 In the case of reproductive 
rights, moreover, the Court recognizes the right to the individual as 
linked to the betterment of society as well.274 
V. STANDARDS FOR DENYING RIGHTS  
The ADA’s protection of access to public services in Title II may 
be seen as guaranteeing important civil rights to all citizens with 
disabilities, along the lines we have outlined for the right to access 
the courts. In this section, we consider some aspects of the tradition 
of protecting rights as applied to people with disabilities. In the next 
section, we take three different examples (the right to vote, the right 
to a public higher education, and disabled veterans’ right to 
employment protection) to demonstrate how arguments can be 
developed aligning Title II (and perhaps even Title I) as congruent 
and proportional to the protection of such rights. 
Before turning to these cases, however, we should consider the 
difficulty of freeing judicial thinking from the notion, embedded in 
and by Cleburne, that citizens who are disabled receive special 
benefits bestowed by virtue of their differences and that the door is 
thereby opened to imposing special burdens on their exercise of 
rights.275 Disabled people commonly are stereotyped this way, as 
deficient in their contributions to the community and consequently as 
failing to reciprocate sufficiently to deserve robust protection of their 
rights.276 This picture is at the core of much disability discrimination. 
 
 273. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541. 
 274. Id. 
 275. In oral arguments in Lane, William J. Brown, representing Lane and Jones, properly 
(in our opinion) resisted Justice Ginsburg’s construal that to provide elevators is to treat a class 
of people specially, and, more broadly, her suggestion that to respect the dignity of disabled 
people requires a kind of permanent affirmative action. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 34–
35, Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/ 
oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/02-1667.pdf. Given the Cleburne idea that positive 
special treatment reciprocally opens the door to the imposition of special burdens, the idea that 
disabled people are given special benefits when they are enabled to exercise ordinary rights 
should be resisted. 
 276. See generally Anita Silvers & Leslie Pickering Francis, Justice Through Trust: 
Disability and the “Outlier Problem” in Social Contract Theory, 116 ETHICS 40 (2005) 
(supporting this viewpoint).  
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The influential philosopher John Rawls, for example, limited 
obligations of justice to fully cooperating members of society.277  
Obvious counterexamples to such fictions are war veterans with 
service-incurred disabilities, who are considered to be citizens who 
deserve full opportunity to exercise the rights they sacrificed to 
sustain. To counter the stereotype, we address in the discussion in the 
next section how important a right must be to prevent states from 
maintaining barriers that curtail a disabled veteran’s opportunity to 
exercise it and how strong a public interest a state must have in 
maintaining the barrier to do so at the expense of a veteran with a 
service-related disability. These questions cannot be answered 
without careful attention to the rationales states offer for disability-
based denials of rights. They address the criteria associated with the 
standard of “rational basis.”  
What standards must such denials meet? The majority in Cleburne 
states that “[t]he State may not rely on a classification whose 
relationship to an asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the 
distinction arbitrary or irrational.”278 Moreover, in his concurrence in 
Cleburne, Justice Stevens proposes an additional test to flesh out the 
standard. Returning to the close tie the Court exposited between 
special benefits and special burdens, he advances a “rational person” 
test against which to measure whether the latter are properly 
levied.279 The test determines whether a public interest is sufficiently 
great, or whether a rights denial burden is too great, to curtail various 
kinds of rights.280 An impartial legislator, Justice Stevens says, 
indeed “even a member of a class of persons defined as mentally 
retarded,” could rationally vote in favor of laws that offered special 
benefits needed by mentally retarded people and, concomitantly,  
[A] mentally retarded person could also recognize that he is a 
member of a class that might need special supervision in some 
 
 277. See JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 18–19 (Erin Kelly ed., 
2001). For criticisms of this view, see MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: 
DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP, at ch. 3 (2006) and Silvers & Francis, supra 
note 276.  
 278. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985). 
 279. Id. at 452 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 280. Id. 
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situations, both to protect himself and to protect others. 
Restrictions on his right to drive cars or to operate hazardous 
equipment might well seem rational even though they deprived 
him of employment opportunities and the kind of freedom of 
travel enjoyed by other citizens.281  
This “rational person” test has broad application. Every citizen 
can make use of such a process in acknowledging his obligations to 
limit his own liberty in deference to the public interest. Self-
recognition of one’s own limiting differences, gained through self-
awareness of one’s own deficits or needs, should rationally lead a 
person to concur in the limitation of his own opportunities and 
curtailment of his own rights. The test suggested by Justice Stevens 
thus interpolates the perspectives of subjects with disabilities as 
premises in valid arguments about constraints on themselves.  
Of course, a class’s boundaries must be carefully drawn if the 
acquiescence of its members to incursions on their rights is rational. 
The “rational person” test requires that there be positive and plausible 
reasons for policies sacrificing disabled people’s opportunity to 
exercise important or fundamental rights. The illustration given 
above suffers in this regard by stereotyping people with mental 
retardation—even mild retardation—as unsafe to drive. This is not 
always the case, and someone with a cognitive disability is not 
rationally obligated to agree to be classified in a group that is unsafe 
to drive if he is a good driver, even if he shares some other group 
characteristics with typically bad drivers, unless there is no 
independent way to distinguish competent from incompetent drivers 
within the group.  
Disabled people thus would be rational in endorsing curtailment 
of their own freedom of travel only if a public value—embracing 
both their own and other people’s interests—is advanced thereby, and 
only if the deprivation is narrowly tailored to reduce freedom by no 
more than is needed, and to deprive the smallest population necessary 
to secure the relevant interest. These features of the “rational person” 
test indicate what is at stake in justifying disability-based denial of 
rights: the exclusion of disabled people (or a subset of the disabled) 
 
 281. Id. at 454. 
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from exercising the right in question must strengthen, rather than 
diminish, the public value of the right. Concomitantly, denying 
disabled people (or a subset) opportunity to access the right will be 
contra-indicated if doing so decreases the public value of the right.  
VI. LATENT IN CLEBURNE, PATENT IN LANE: THE IMPORTANT  
RIGHTS MODEL 
In this section we apply the model we found latent in Cleburne, 
and then patent in Lane, to consider three kinds of important rights 
that courts should not presume states may compromise without 
careful inspection of the purported rationales. The first is the right of 
access to the secret ballot, which is instrumental for maintaining 
constitutionally protected voting rights. The second is the right of 
access to public higher education, which is instrumental for 
maintaining an inclusive, productive and public-spirited citizenry. 
The third is the right of access to post-military service employment, 
which is instrumental for maintaining a military reserve that is 
important to both the nation’s and the states’ defense. In all three 
cases, we maintain, disability discrimination that denies instrumental 
rights places a substantial burden on disabled people and 
concomitantly requires evidence of a substantial state interest pursued 
neither arbitrarily or irrationally. As well, in all three cases, excluding 
disabled people from the opportunity to exercise the right detracts 
from its value to everyone. 
From the cry of “no taxation without representation,” the 
importance of the ability to vote for representatives of one’s choosing 
has been central to American democracy. The Fifteenth Amendment 
singled out the right to vote. Women’s suffrage became the rallying 
point for changing the status of women. The Voting Rights Act,282 
recently renewed for twenty-five years with a unanimous vote in the 
United States Senate,283 protects people against discriminatory 
practices infringing on the right to vote. Many states, especially in the 
 
 282. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000). 
 283. Carl Hulse, By a Vote of 98–0, Senate Approves 25-Year Extension of Voting Rights 
Act, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2006, at A16. 
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West, have robust traditions of citizen-initiated legislation and 
constitutional amendment processes that depend on the vote.  
For people who have been historically excluded, as the disabled 
have been,284 the ability to exercise the right to vote is especially 
important. Voting symbolizes inclusion in the citizenry, and voting 
citizens influence policy both through the vote itself and by swaying 
candidates who seek their vote. People with physical disabilities have 
had to endure the practical barriers of inaccessible voting places.285 
People with mental retardation or mental illness have been deprived 
of the right to vote simply by virtue of their classifications, regardless 
of their actual ability to understand and participate in the political 
process.286  
Michael Waterstone has recently detailed the importance of the 
right to vote for people with disabilities.287 Waterstone argues 
convincingly that voting is a fundamental right and therefore 
warrants the heightened scrutiny that would extend the analysis of 
Lane to it.288 We agree with Waterstone’s conclusion, but suggest 
that the analysis should be pushed further, to fundamental rights 
rather than to a somewhat broader group of important rights, and 
finally to a related group of instrumental rights, as the Lane Court’s 
list of rights-protective cases suggests. 
Voting rights are fundamental, but the status of associated rights 
that are instrumental to the exercise of the franchise is less clear. This 
issue looms large for people with disabilities who cannot read a 
 
 284. See, e.g., Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 588–89 (1999).  
 285. See, e.g., Michael Waterstone, Constitutional and Statutory Voting Rights for People 
with Disabilities, 14 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 353, 355–57 (2003). 
 286. See, e.g., Kay Schriner et al., Democratic Dilemmas: Notes on the ADA and Voting 
Rights of People with Cognitive and Emotional Impairments, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
437 (2000).  
 287. See Michael E. Waterstone, Lane, Fundamental Rights, and Voting, 56 ALA. L. REV. 
793 (2005). Waterstone’s article, which we discovered when our article was virtually complete, 
argues, as we do, for the role rights can play in the development of a heightened scrutiny 
analysis after Lane. His principal case study is voting rights. While we agree with his analysis 
as far as it goes, it does not point out the critical importance of the shift from classes of persons 
to rights, nor does it embed an understanding of where the Court went wrong in the reasons the 
Court afforded only rational basis scrutiny for classifications of people with disabilities in 
Cleburne.  
 288. Id. at 824–49. 
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printed ballot or who cannot use a stylus to punch out a chad.289 
Although some state constitutions specifically guarantee the right to a 
secret ballot,290 it has not been specifically identified as a 
fundamental federal constitutional right.291 Voters who cannot vote 
secretly, however, may be subject to intimidation or ridicule. 
Furthermore, they may worry that those who know their votes may 
act clandestinely to destroy ballots with disfavored choices. These 
risks press especially seriously when some people, already 
marginalized, cannot keep their ballots secret while others, not 
marginalized, can routinely and easily do so. Such disparate access to 
the instrument so crucial to exercising the right compromises both the 
value of the right to those denied access to secret balloting and its 
public value, because the ballet’s secrecy is important to its integrity. 
The Help America Vote Act (HAVA)292 directs that secret 
balloting be available to citizens with disabilities. This legislation has 
prompted commercial development of various kinds of adaptive 
voting machines and devices, accompanied by energetic marketing 
efforts by manufacturers.293 The response to HAVA is a striking 
example of progress in law promoting progress in fact: technological 
potential to make crucial activities accessible to the disabled is being 
transformed to technological reality far more vigorously as a result of 
the legislation. The problem of states permitting the practice of 
 
 289. One appellate court decision rejected a lawsuit against Texas’s voting procedures 
under the ADA on the somewhat curious theory that the ADA is not a voting rights statute. 
Lightbourn v. County of El Paso, 118 F.3d 421 (5th Cir. 1997). Title II of the ADA does not 
specify a particular list of public services for coverage; the Court could have similarly asserted 
that the Lane litigation should have been rejected because the ADA is not a courthouse statute. 
For an account of the Lightbourn litigation, see James C. Harrington, Pencils Within Reach and 
a Walkman or Two: Making the Secret Ballot Available to Voters Who Are Blind or Have Other 
Physical Disabilities, 4 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 87 (1999). 
 290. See, e.g., Michael Waterstone, Civil Rights and the Administration of Elections—
Toward Secret Ballot and Polling Place Access, 8 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 101, 105–06 
(2004); Waterstone, supra note 285, at 359.  
 291. For a discussion of the state of Washington’s explicit constitutional guarantee, see 
Erik Van Hagen, Note, The Not-So-Secret Ballot: How Washington Fails to Provide a Secret 
Vote for Impaired Voters as Required by the Washington State Constitution, 80 WASH. L. REV. 
787 (2005). 
 292. Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 293. See, e.g., Trace Center, Accessible Voting, http://trace.wisc.edu/world/kiosks/ez/ 
voting/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2007). 
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compromising disabled people’s right to secret balloting remains, 
however. Waterstone thinks Lane argues for amending HAVA to 
enable suits for private damages.294 But such a piece-meal strategy 
risks dispersing integration efforts into a fractured and untimely 
pattern of statutes that sows even more confusion about how courts 
will address disability-based denials of important rights.  
Wheelchair-accessible courtrooms and court proceedings 
accessible to hearing-impaired citizens are (in Cleburne’s terms) 
instrumental for accessing fundamental constitutionally guaranteed 
rights. The right to a secret ballot is similarly important because it is 
also instrumental to exercising fundamental constitutionally 
guaranteed rights. Education is also a very important and 
instrumental, but not fundamental, right.295 In Plyler v. Doe,296 a 
decision striking down on equal protection grounds a Texas ban on 
the use of state education funds for schooling children not legally 
admitted to the United States, the Supreme Court held education to be 
sufficiently important to the well-being of both individuals and 
society to call for careful examination of a state’s interest in denying 
education to certain children.297 Unlike access to courtrooms and 
secret balloting, however, education is not instrumental to a 
constitutionally enumerated right.  
The crucial features leading to the Plyler decision were (1) that 
the children deprived of opportunity had little control over their 
immigration status;298 (2) that depriving them of the specific 
opportunity threatened to have lasting negative impact on their 
lives;299 (3) specifically that denying the opportunity deprived them 
of “the basic tools by which individuals might lead economically 
productive lives to the benefit of us all”;300 (4) “for transmitting ‘the 
values on which our society rests”;301 and (5) because “education has 
 
 294. See Waterstone, supra note 287, at 825.  
 295. See, e.g., Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 116 YALE L.J. 
330 (2006). Liu, in a footnote, suggests the possibility of characterizing Lane as recognizing 
rights to national citizenship, the possibility we are developing in this article. Id. at 408 n.367. 
 296. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S 202 (1982). 
 297. Id. at 230.  
 298. Id. at 220.  
 299. Id. at 221.  
 300. Id.  
 301. Id. (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979)). 
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a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society.”302 These 
crucial considerations, the Court found, trumped the state’s economic 
interest in not educating the undocumented children in Texas’s 
school systems.303  
Analogous elements to Plyler are readily apparent in many Title II 
claims by disabled students for access to public higher education that 
traditionally has been made available by states for their citizens to 
achieve productive lives and be well instructed in public values. After 
the American Revolution states began to organize publicly controlled 
institutions.304 The federal government supported states’ higher 
education efforts with the Morrill Act of 1862,305 explicitly “to 
promote the liberal and practical education of the industrial classes in 
the several pursuits and professions in life.”306 In describing the 
legislation’s purpose in 1887, Senator Morrill explained: 
The land-grant colleges were founded on the idea that a higher 
and broader education should be placed in every State within 
the reach of those whose destiny assigns them to, or who may 
have the courage to choose industrial locations where the 
wealth of nations is produced; where advanced civilization 
unfolds its comforts, and where a much larger number of the 
people need wider educational advantages, and impatiently 
await their possession.307 
Speaking before the Vermont Legislature in 1888, Morrill observed: 
“The fundamental idea was to offer an opportunity in every State for 
a liberal and larger education to larger numbers . . . .”308  
Although Plyler did not involve access to higher education, its 
conclusions about primary education are paralleled by the role played 
by higher education for people with disabilities. Higher education 
makes possible the lifelong productivity of many disabled people 
 
 302. Id.  
 303. Id. at 221–23.  
 304. See The Land-Grant Tradition, http://www.nasulgc.org/publications/Land_Grant/ 
Development.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2007). 
 305. See, e.g., Backgrounder on the Morrill Act, http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/ 
democrac/27.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2007).  
 306. Id. (quoting Morrill Act of 1862, 12 Stat. 503 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 301)). 
 307. Id. (quoting an 1887 address of Hon. Justin W. Morrill). 
 308. Id. 
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who cannot do manual jobs. Because universities prepare students for 
many kinds of professions not requiring manual labor, the right to 
access higher education is especially important to disabled people. 
Denying access to a university education deprives disabled people of 
the tools for economically productive lives.  
The extent of the disability-based denial of higher education 
opportunity that still exists, more than three decades after the 
amended Rehabilitation Act directed federal funding recipients to 
take remedial steps,309 cannot help but raise the specter of animus-
propelled neglect.310 Against this background, courts may not simply 
presume that states have sufficiently substantial reasons for denying 
equitable access to higher education on the basis of disability. 
Inspection of the important state interests being served is appropriate 
when states continue to deny disabled students’ claims to instruments 
for accessing education such as sign language interpreters, screen-
reader compatible instructional software, and ramps and elevators for 
classroom buildings. Judicial inspection of states’ rationales should 
exhibit the degree of care the Supreme Court took in Plyler in 
examining Texas’s reasons for denying a public education to children 
not legally admitted to the United States.  
Further evidence of the central importance of higher education 
may be found in the history of United States veterans’ benefits. The 
main tools deployed by the Service Members’ Readjustment Act of 
1944 to help veterans assimilate into civilian life were funding for 
college education and home loan guarantees.311 Higher education 
benefits remain a crucial means by which the nation thanks veterans 
for their service.312 For veterans with service-related disabilities, 
 
 309. E.g., Laura F. Rothstein, The Affirmative Action Debate in Legal Education and the 
Legal Profession: Lessons from Disability Discrimination Law, 2 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 1 
(1998) (querying indicators used in law school admissions). 
 310. When a state distributes benefits unequally, the lines it draws between classes of 
beneficiaries are subject to scrutiny under equal protection principles. See Hooper v. Bernalillo 
County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 618 (1985). The difference in allocation must further an 
important or legitimate state purpose. Id. But it is difficult to see what state purpose is furthered 
by not allocating access to higher education to disabled people while other groups are given 
access. 
 311. See, e.g., Democratic GI Bill of Rights for the 21st Century, http://kendrickmeek. 
house.gov/GIBill.shtml (accessed January 2007).  
 312. Id.  
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higher education has had strongly documented importance in 
maintaining access to opportunity and a return to productive lives.313  
The right to educational benefits for disabled veterans, however, 
can be exercised successfully only by making universities accessible. 
We note in this regard how intricately the treatment of disabled 
veterans is intertwined with civil rights protections. And so it is out 
of concern about what awaits disabled veterans that we turn, finally, 
to the boldest of our proposals extrapolating from Lane stronger 
protection against disability-based denial of rights.  
To set the scene, we consider what welcome will greet returning 
veterans whose lives have become profoundly different because of 
service-incurred disabilities. The difficulties disabled veterans of past 
wars have faced in obtaining employment are legendary but also true. 
A useful reminder of what life has been like for them is the 1951 film 
Bright Victory314 (based on a 1945 Baynard Kendrick novel called 
Lights Out315) in which a white soldier, blinded in battle, 
subsequently finds himself as decisively rejected by his pre-war 
employer as African Americans also were in the World War II era 
United States.  
Today, the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment 
Rights Act of 1997 (USERRA)316 is meant to prevent discrimination 
against individuals who have had to leave their jobs for active service 
in the armed forces. Jobs must be held open for veterans upon their 
return from service, even if their absence has been prolonged by 
hospitalization for injuries.317 Employers must provide reasonable 
accommodations for veterans with service-incurred or aggravated 
disabilities, including helping an employee who cannot pursue the 
previous line of work become qualified for the closest workable 
 
 313. For a survey of federal support for educational opportunity, including the GI Bill, see 
Robert Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian Means: Values, Constraints, and 
Finance in the Design of a Comprehensive and Contemporary American “Ownership Society,” 
79 S. CAL. L. REV. 45, 145 & n.299 (2005).  
 314. BRIGHT VICTORY (Universal Pictures 1951). For a description of the film, see Classic 
Film Guide, http://www.classicfilmguide.com/index.php?s=pageA&item=79 (last visited Feb. 
16, 2007).  
 315. BAYNARD KENDRICK, LIGHTS OUT (1945). 
 316. Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 
103-353, 108 Stat. 3149 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 10, and 38 U.S.C.).  
 317. 38 U.S.C. § 4312 (2000). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p33 Francis Silvers book pages.doc  3/29/2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
86 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 23:33 
 
 
position equivalent in seniority, status, and pay to what the individual 
would otherwise be entitled.318 USERRA applies these requirements 
to all employers, including state governments.319 Congress designed 
USERRA so that it should prevent state employees who are 
temporarily absent from work due to service-incurred disability from 
suffering the harm that befell the lead plaintiff in Garrett, a state 
employee who was demoted on return to work from an absence due 
to disability.320  
It is uncertain whether courts will recognize Congress’s power to 
protect state employees from disability discrimination as USERRA is 
designed to do, even employees who have been disabled in service of 
their country. In 1998 the Seventh Circuit held that sovereign 
immunity bars USERRA suits by private individuals against state 
government employers.321 Although USERRA suits may be brought 
in state courts they are limited by what each individual state 
permits.322 Further, in 2002, a federal district court in Texas followed 
Cleburne’s reasoning by holding that veterans are not a suspect class 
and thus discrimination against them need have only a rational 
basis.323 Congress’s attempt through USERRA to give veterans 
employment protection from disability discrimination appears to be 
subject to the same treatment courts gave Congress’s attempt to 
protect citizens generally through Title I of the ADA.  
In pursuing this course, courts should not fail to examine state 
rationales for discriminating against disabled veterans. A clear record 
of employment discrimination against disabled veterans can be traced 
from the Civil War through the war in Vietnam.324 In light of that 
record, citizens understandably may be reluctant to volunteer for 
 
 318. Id. § 4312(e). 
 319. Id. § 4323. 
 320. Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 362 (2001) (Garrett was informed she would need 
to give up her director of nursing position after a leave for treatment for breast cancer). 
 321. Velasquez v. Frapwell, 160 F.3d 389, 393 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 322. Id. at 394. 
 323. Howard v. United States, No. SA-01-CA-1165-OG, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26535 
(W.D. Tex. Nov. 22, 2002). 
 324. The Veterans’ Readjustment Act of 1974 was a response to the difficult employment 
situation faced by disabled veterans of the Vietnam War. Cornelius J. Peck, Employment 
Problems of the Handicapped: Would Title VII Remedies Be Appropriate and Effective?, 16 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 343, 344 n.9 (1983); see also Ann Hubbard, A Military-Civilian Coalition 
for Disability Rights, 75 MISS. L.J. 975 (2006). 
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service, since doing so increases their chances of becoming disabled 
and, correspondingly, the probability of becoming vulnerable to 
disability discrimination. Indeed, Congress guaranteed employment 
protection in USERRA explicitly to induce citizens to enlist in the 
national reserve.325  
It is difficult to imagine what interest states might claim to justify 
disability-based discrimination against veterans. States’ interests in 
facilitating a strong military reserve can be no less great than 
Congress’s. Both state and nation equally have an interest in 
protecting a right to employment for individuals who voluntarily 
jeopardize their future productivity for the good of the nation. Both 
equally have an obligation to acknowledge the contributions of 
veterans with service-incurred disabilities, and courts legitimately 
may turn a spotlight on states’ reasons for not doing so. 
VII. CITIZENS’ RIGHTS VERSUS STATES’ RATIONALES 
The ADA is well-known as the last of the major civil rights laws 
and as Congress’s strongly supported effort to protect citizens against 
disability discrimination. Less well appreciated, however, is the 
taxonomy of rights needed to understand both what occurs in 
disability discrimination and how the ADA can work to deal with it. 
Along the path from Cleburne to Lane, we have identified two 
important categories of rights that are compromised by disability 
discrimination. One category includes constitutionally enumerated, 
fundamental, and other rights that are intrinsically important because 
they are needed to maintain the nation’s values and traditions. The 
second category consists of instrumental rights that are derivatively 
important because they are necessary to exercise rights in the former 
category.326 The two categories are so intimately related that 
Congress either has the power to abrogate state immunity in both 
categories, or in neither.  
 
 325. 38 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(1) (2000). 
 326. The instrumental/intrinsic distinction should not be confused with the 
inherent/extrinsic distinction. The latter marks a metaphysical difference, distinguishing 
whether the good-making characteristic resides in the object or separate from it. The former, 
which is the distinction used in this article, differentiates between the means and end.  
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As their name implies, the instrumental rights in the latter 
category offer access to the tools and venues needed for exercising 
the intrinsic rights in the former category. Disability discrimination 
that deprives disabled people of instrumentally important rights 
therefore imposes much more than an incidental burden, for the loss 
of intrinsically important rights will follow upon the loss of the 
instrumentally important rights necessary to use them. Understanding 
that intrinsically valuable rights depend upon instrumentally valuable 
ones for their implementation, and that instrumentally valuable rights 
depend on intrinsically valuable ones for their worth, explains why 
the roster of relevant rights vulnerable to disability discrimination is 
large and complex.  
Rights in both categories—not just in the former—are entitled to 
special solicitude by courts, we have argued. In this regard, Lane 
initiates a welcome change of direction in the dialogue about 
disability discrimination. Lane attempts to move beyond debating 
who has been victimized by disability discrimination (and who the 
victimizers have been) to discerning how disabled people have been 
victimized; that is, to better understanding how people’s liberties 
have been and continue to be abridged based on disability.  
Disabled people, and disability itself, are so variable that courts 
have tended to individualize, and thereby circumscribe the influence 
of, their decisions that wrongful disability discrimination has 
occurred. We saw this way of thinking initiated prior to the passage 
of the ADA in Cleburne, where a zoning ordinance was invalidated 
as applied to thirteen mentally retarded people, but where the finding 
of wrongful treatment was explicitly prevented from casting a 
protective arm around the entire classification of mentally retarded 
people.327 The approach in Lane also has been characterized as “as 
applied.”328 But unlike Cleburne, Lane does not hypothesize that 
there may be other individuals who also are wheelchair users but 
whose exclusion on that basis from courtrooms that could be made 
 
 327. See supra Part I. 
 328. See, e.g., Schwan, supra note 190, at 239 (“[W]hile Lane was seemingly a victory for 
the rights of the disabled, its new as-applied approach will continue to create confusion among 
lower courts attempting to analyze other sovereign immunity disputes.”). 
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accessible still can be explained away sufficiently by some state 
rationale.329  
In general, on the conceptualization for which we find support in 
Lane, deprivation of an important instrumental right such as access to 
courtrooms generally merits suspicion and careful inspection of the 
rationale. The judgment that a disability-based deprivation of a right 
was wrongful can be extrapolated logically in two different ways. It 
can be extrapolated to cases about other rights that are instrumentally 
important for the same intrinsically important purpose. And it also 
can be extrapolated to cases where the same instrumental right is 
important for exercising other intrinsically important rights.  
The importance of the right to physically access courtrooms is 
instrumental to the intrinsically important right to confront one’s 
accuser, and both kinds of importance spill over to rights beyond 
those explicitly considered in Lane. Other instrumental rights 
pertaining to this intrinsic one share the importance Lane accorded 
access to courtrooms. The Lane Court inspected Tennessee’s 
rationale for curtailing courtroom access to wheelchair using citizens. 
It would be perverse to hold that other rights of access to the same 
intrinsically important right—for example, the instrumental right to 
have court proceedings communicated in an understandable way—do 
not merit similar scrutiny because Lane only addresses access to 
entering a courtroom and does not address access to what is being 
said during proceedings in the courtroom, or because Lane addresses 
wheelchair users rather than American Sign Language interpreter 
service users.  
It would be perverse as well to scrutinize blocked access to 
courtrooms but reject similarly scrutinizing disability-based denials 
of access to other physical venues where the state conducts business. 
For the state does not restrict its conduct of important business to 
courtrooms alone, and so a high degree of burden may be imposed on 
 
 329. Lane does, of course, provide that it may not be possible, or may be unduly 
burdensome, to make some courtrooms wheelchair accessible, pointing out this qualification in 
the ADA goes to its proportionality. But for Lane (and for the ADA) the alternatives are 
wheelchair accessibility if possible or no accessibility if impossible, not wheelchair 
accessibility for some wheelchair users but not others. Cleburne, in contrast, provides for access 
to residency for thirteen members of this classification (disabled) but explicitly resists 
committing to access for more than the particular thirteen.  
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citizens excluded from other state venues because of their disabilities 
if these are venues where citizens must go to exercise intrinsically 
important rights. This observation suggests the mode in which the 
constitutional umbrella shelters the ADA, namely, by pursuing 
prophylactic questions and answering them in regulations developed 
by the appropriate agencies. To illustrate, regulation makers must 
decide whether proportionality is served or disturbed by requiring 
accessibility for facilities such as public hockey rinks in preparation 
for a time when the facilities are pressed into service to shelter 
citizens in a hurricane or heat wave. While it might seem excessive to 
suppose citizens in wheelchairs have a right to attend hockey games, 
death is an excessive burden to impose on wheelchair-using citizens 
(but not others) because the inaccessible recreational facilities do 
double duty as state-designated emergency shelters.330 The rationale 
permitting their exclusion from recreational events does not reach to 
rationalizing the special burden of exclusion from emergency shelters 
at the risk of their lives. Extrapolated forethought is called for in 
cases like this because citizens sitting in their wheelchairs outside the 
shelters cannot in that moment obtain legal relief on an “as applied” 
basis.  
Following Lane, we believe, courts may therefore increase the 
roster of disability-based rights deprivations that merit scrutiny. We 
have indicated above how these might be extrapolated from Lane or 
from other cases like some of those cited in Lane. But what to 
anticipate from scrutiny? Several basic questions to pose about states’ 
rationales for abridging their disabled citizen’s rights suggest 
themselves. 
First, how important to citizens generally is the public interest 
secured by sacrificing disabled citizens’ rights? Second, to gain more 
precision, is the public interest to which disabled citizens’ interests 
are sacrificed of greater value than the valuable rights or liberty they 
are being asked to forgo? Third, is the prevailing public interest of 
similar value to disabled and non-disabled citizens alike, as assessed 
 
 330. For an overview of the failure to include people with disabilities in emergency 
preparedness planning, see NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, SAVING LIVES: INCLUDING PEOPLE 
WITH DISABILITIES IN EMERGENCY PLANNING (2005), available at http://www.ncd.gov/ 
newsroom/publications/2005/pdf/saving_lives.pdf.  
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by Justice Stevens’s “rational person” test, pointing out that people 
both with and without cognitive disabilities have the same interest in 
allowing only competent drivers on the road. Fourth, are the 
assignments of burdens and the presumptions about who will 
sacrifice rights irrational or arbitrary? And fifth, is there no other 
route to securing the public interest than diminishing the liberty and 
opportunity of disabled citizens? 
VIII. CONCLUSION: THE COURTS’ ROLE  
Answers to all these questions are affected by the uneasy 
interaction between perceptions of the public interest and disabled 
people’s rights. Courts can construe these as complementary or 
instead as competitive. Lane’s future impact will be mediated by the 
care with which courts address this dynamic.  
An infamous Supreme Court ruling about disability illustrates the 
result of conceiving of disabled people’s liberty as pitted against the 
public good. The state of Virginia won the decision in Buck v. Bell,331 
a case that upheld the state’s policy of sterilizing “feebleminded” 
people in the name of the public good. Seventy-five years later, 
however, Virginia apologized to those citizens whose reproductive 
liberty the state had denied with the policy defended in Buck.332 As 
even the winning party now holds the policy to have been wrong, it is 
hard to see how the case was not wrongly decided. As history shows, 
the aftermath of the case was that (some) states imposed heavy 
burdens on the liberty of disabled people.  
During the twentieth century, a number of states curtailed the 
reproductive freedom of disabled people by sterilizing them.333 
“Feebleminded” people most often were targets of this practice. 
Feeblemindedness, an artificial classification that mixed biological 
and moral notions, was a quintessential stereotype, applied to people 
with cognitive disabilities, hearing impairments, seizure disorders, 
oddly shaped jaws or large ears, or tendencies toward fecundity 
 
 331. 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
 332. See Virginia Governor Apologizes for Eugenics Law, USA TODAY, June 2, 2002, at 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2002/05/02/virginia-eugenics.htm. 
 333. See generally TROY DUSTER, BACKDOOR TO EUGENICS (1st ed. 1990).  
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outside marriage (this last was the symptom that earned the diagnosis 
of “feeblemindedness” for the plaintiff in Buck).334 Feeblemindedness 
was made the occasion of much loss of other liberties as well. We 
saw the tendency to scapegoat “feeblemindedness” manifested in the 
language of the city of Cleburne’s zoning ordinance, which explicitly 
banned hospitals for feebleminded people from being established 
without a special use permit. To ban the mildly retarded individuals 
who would live in the group home, the city stereotyped them as 
“feebleminded.”335  
“Feeblemindedness” was not the only disability that occasioned 
the burden of reproductive liberty being curtailed. California, for 
example, also sterilized visually impaired people, including many 
whose blindness was acquired, not inherited.336 Visually impaired 
people also were vulnerable to the rationale to which Justice Holmes 
gave voice in Buck: “the public welfare may call upon the best 
citizens for their lives” so “it would be strange if it could not call 
upon those who already sap the strength of the State for these lesser 
sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those concerned, in order to 
prevent our being swamped with incompetence.”337 Over 60,000 
Americans with disabilities lost their reproductive liberty because of 
sterilization laws that were sheltered by the kind of rationale 
articulated by Justice Holmes.338 States’ sterilization programs 
continued through the 1970s.339 The abrogation of reproductive 
freedom in the different states targeted somewhat different 
diagnoses,340 advanced different rationales (sometimes a eugenics 
theory, sometimes a paternalistic theory about denying children to 
 
 334. Buck, 274 U.S. at 205–06. 
 335. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc. v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1984). 
 336. See, e.g., Alexandra Minna Stern, Sterilized in the Name of Public Health: Race, 
Immigration, and Reproductive Control in Modern California, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1128 
(2005); see also ANITA SILVERS ET AL., DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION: 
PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN BIOETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 42 (1998); Daniel J. Kevles, 
Grounds for Breeding: The Amazing Persistence of Eugenics in Europe and North America, 
TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, Jan. 2, 1998, at 3. 
 337. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207.  
 338. See Stern, supra note 336, at 1128.  
 339. See DUSTER, supra note 333, at 30; DANIEL J. KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS: 
GENETICS AND THE USES OF HUMAN HEREDITY 275 (1995). 
 340. See DUSTER, supra note 333, at 30. 
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incompetent parents),341 and took different measures (some states 
sterilized disabled people to prevent their reproducing while others 
simply locked them up).342  
Even the Supreme Court’s recognition in 1942 in Skinner that the 
right to have offspring is “basic to the perpetuation of a race and an 
important area of human rights” went no distance toward protecting 
the disabled. Thirty-seven years elapsed between Skinner (an equal 
protection case invalidating Oklahoma’s policy of sterilizing 
recidivist robbers343) and the year (1979) when Virginia ended its 
state policy of sterilizing disabled people.344 For the Skinner Court 
carefully crafted its ruling so as to embrace the finding of Buck and to 
distance convicted criminals, whom the Constitution protected 
against sterilization, from “feebleminded” people whom, according to 
Buck, the Constitution did not.345 Although taking reproductive 
liberty to be an important public value and (in the words of one of the 
concurrences) taking eugenics programs to be “biological 
experiments at the expense of the dignity and personality and natural 
powers of a minority,”346 the Justices in Skinner accepted that states 
had a rational interest in disabled people’s being burdened with 
deprivation of this right.347 Skinner thus deferred to an error the Court 
embraced in Buck, namely, by presuming that states normally may 
impose disability-based liberty-curtailing burdens by appeal to the 
public interest without scrutinizing whether the rationale invoked is 
wrongly informed about disability.  
 
 341. Id. at 32; see also EDWARD J. LARSON, SEX, RACE, AND SCIENCE: EUGENICS IN THE 
DEEP SOUTH (1995). 
 342. DUSTER, supra note 333, at 31 (discussing Skinner). 
 343. The plaintiff in Skinner had two strikes, having been convicted of chicken thieving 
and then of armed robbery. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 537 (1942). 
Both the majority decision in Skinner, and the two concurrences, take pains to distance 
convicted criminals, whom the majority took to be protected from sterilization for reasons of 
equal protection and the concurrences believed to be protected as a matter of due process, from 
“feebleminded” people who had no constitutional protection according to Buck v. Bell.  
 344. Dave Reynolds, Virginia Governor Apologizes for Eugenics, INCLUSION DAILY 
EXPRESS, May 6, 2002, http://www.inclusiondaily.com/news/advocacy/vaeugenics.htm#05 
0602.  
 345. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 539.  
 346. Id. 
 347. Id. at 540. 
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Patent in the history of Buck and its half century aftermath is that 
the courts themselves are not immune from wrongful disability-based 
rights deprivation. When courts scrutinize states’ rationales for 
disability-based rights deprivation, there is a historically 
demonstrated possibility that bias and pretexts about disability will 
prevail. Over the decades following Skinner, public knowledge 
eventually improved sufficiently to reveal that states’ policies for 
sterilizing people based on disability had to be extremely narrowly 
tailored to serve a legitimate public purpose because disability was 
not to blame for the civic problems invoked in the Buck winner’s 
rationale. But this was too late for many individuals against whom 
the Supreme Court had given states the latitude to act within the 
broad permission accorded states in Buck.  
This history makes it all the more vital for courts to tailor 
narrowly permissions implicit in disability-based abrogations or 
abbreviations of important rights. The presumption should not be, as 
it was in Buck and then again in Cleburne, that there is an inherent 
conflict between the public interest and disabled people’s exercising 
citizens’ important rights, and that therefore it is normal for states to 
compromise the liberty of and impose special burdens on citizens on 
the basis of their disabilities. Lane opens a new road for ADA 
plaintiffs, a road that is illuminated by the importance of rights. 
Nonetheless, misunderstanding about the bearers of these rights 
remains a danger, even if some of the old misleading ways of 
referring to them, such as “feebleminded,” have been abandoned.  
The half-century-old project of achieving integration for disabled 
people will continue to thread its way around judicial road blocks 
until better knowledge and acceptance of disabled people and 
disability informs the courts as well as the culture. Until then, courts 
need to be attentive, rather than relaxed, when states expect disabled 
citizens to bear special burdens. And courts ought to be rigorously 
wary when the burdens states impose based on disability curtail 
important rights. 
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